CVE-2013-3619
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedIntelligent Platform Management Interface (IPMI) with firmware for Supermicro X9 generation motherboards before SMT_X9_317 and firmware for Supermicro X8 generation motherboards before SMT X8 312 contain harcoded private encryption keys for the (1) Lighttpd web server SSL interface and the (2) Dropbear SSH daemon.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceSupermicro X9 and X8 generation motherboards contain hardcoded private SSL and SSH encryption keys embedded in their IPMI/BMC firmware. These static keys for the Lighttpd web server and Dropbear SSH daemon allow attackers who obtain the keys to decrypt traffic, impersonate services, or conduct man-in-the-middle attacks against the IPMI management interface.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 10all versionsall versions< 3.15< 3.12CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- High
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the hardware platform and firmware versionAccess the IPMI/BMC web interface or use IPMI tools (e.g., ipmitool -I lanplus -U ADMIN -P ADMIN fru print) to retrieve the motherboard model and current firmware versionAffected if The device is a Supermicro X9 motherboard with firmware < 3.15, or an X8 motherboard with firmware < 3.12, or a Citrix Netscaler SDX (firmware = 10), or any version of Citrix Netscaler or SD-WAN firmware
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Confirm the BMC/IPMI firmware is the Supermicro SMT variantCheck the BMC firmware revision string via IPMI (ipmitool -I lanplus -U ADMIN -P ADMIN mc info) or through the web UI under Maintenance or Firmware Update. Look for 'SMT_X9' or 'SMT_X8' in the firmware descriptionAffected if The firmware identifier contains SMT_X9 or SMT_X8 and the version is below the patched release (3.15 for X9, 3.12 for X8)
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Verify the IPMI web interface is reachable over the networkAttempt to access the IPMI web server (https://<IPMI_IP>) from a network location or confirm the HTTP/HTTPS ports (80/443) are listening on the IPMI interface using nmap or netstatAffected if The IPMI management interface is network-accessible (not isolated behind a management-only VLAN or firewall)
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Check if the embedded Lighttpd web server is exposedConnect to the IPMI HTTPS port and inspect the SSL certificate. Compare the certificate chain or public key against known defaults for the vulnerable firmware versions, or verify that the same SSL certificate is used across multiple devicesAffected if The web interface uses the hardcoded SSL certificate/private key embedded in the vulnerable firmware (same cert visible on multiple systems)
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Determine if SSH (Dropbear) on the IPMI interface is accessibleAttempt an SSH connection to the IPMI IP address (ipmitool -I lanplus ssh) or check if port 22 is open on the BMC interface. Inspect the host key on connection for known fingerprints from the static key pairAffected if SSH access to the IPMI interface is enabled and uses the hardcoded Dropbear host key from the vulnerable firmware
You are affected if your device is a Supermicro X9 (firmware < 3.15) or X8 (firmware < 3.12) with IPMI exposed to the network, or any Citrix Netscaler SDX/SD-WAN version, and the IPMI web or SSH services are accessible using the default embedded keys.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor data3.123.15
Update IPMI firmware to SMT_X9_317 or later (X9) and SMT X8 312 or later (X8). If immediate patching is impossible, restrict network access to IPMI interfaces using firewalls or VLANs, and consider disabling remote IPMI access until firmware can be updated.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation3.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2013-3619 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2013-3619 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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