CVE-2013-3620
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedHardcoded WSMan credentials in Intelligent Platform Management Interface (IPMI) with firmware for Supermicro X9 generation motherboards before 3.15 (SMT_X9_315) and firmware for Supermicro X8 generation motherboards before SMT X8 312.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceHardcoded WSMan credentials exist in the Intelligent Platform Management Interface (IPMI) firmware of Supermicro X9 generation motherboards before version 3.15 (SMT_X9_315) and X8 generation motherboards before SMT X8 312. These static credentials allow remote attackers to bypass authentication and gain unauthorized access to the IPMI management interface.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 10all versionsall versions< 3.15< 3.12CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the hardware platformDetermine if the target system is a Supermicro X8 or X9 generation motherboard, or a Citrix Netscaler (SDX, standard, or SD-WAN) appliance. Check system inventory, BIOS information, or physically label the server.Affected if The system is a Supermicro X8/X9 motherboard or any Citrix Netscaler variant.
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Check Supermicro IPMI firmware versionAccess the IPMI web interface or use IPMI utilities (ipmitool) to query the firmware version. Command example: 'ipmitool -I lanplus -H <IPMI_IP> -U ADMIN -P ADMIN fru print' or check the BMC firmware version through the web UI under 'Maintenance' or 'Firmware Update'.Affected if The IPMI firmware version is below 3.15 for X9 motherboards or below 3.12 for X8 motherboards.
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Confirm Citrix Netscaler variant and versionFor Citrix Netscaler systems, run 'show version' in the CLI or check the web UI under 'System' > 'Diagnostics' > 'Show Version'. Identify whether it is SDX, standard, or SD-WAN model.Affected if Any Citrix Netscaler SDX firmware version 10, or any version of Citrix Netscaler standard or SD-WAN firmware, is affected.
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Verify if WSMan remote access is enabledCheck the IPMI/BMC configuration for WSMan (Windows Remote Management) settings. In the Supermicro IPMI web UI, go to 'Settings' > 'Services' or 'Remote Management' and look for WSMan or remote IPMI over HTTP/HTTPS services. Use ipmitool: 'ipmitool -I lanplus -H <IPMI_IP> -U ADMIN -P ADMIN raw 0x32 0x76 0x01 0x00' or check BMC network services.Affected if WSMan or remote IPMI management interfaces are enabled and accessible over the network.
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Check IPMI network accessibilityPing the IPMI/BMC IP address and attempt to connect to ports 623 (UDP - IPMI), 443 (HTTPS - web UI), or 5985/5986 (WinRM/WSMan). Use 'nmap -sU -p 623 <IPMI_IP>' to verify IPMI is exposed.Affected if The IPMI interface is reachable from untrusted networks, indicating potential exposure to remote attackers.
A system is affected if it is a Supermicro X8/X9 motherboard with IPMI firmware below 3.15/3.12, or any Citrix Netscaler (SDX, SD-WAN, or standard), and the IPMI/WSMan interface is network-accessible.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor data3.123.15
Update IPMI firmware to SMT_X9_315 or later for X9 motherboards, and SMT X8 312 or later for X8 motherboards. If firmware updates are not feasible, isolate IPMI interfaces on a restricted network segment and disable remote WSMan access.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2013-3620 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2013-3620 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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