BladecenterHardware / appliance · Ibm

CVE-2013-4031

HIGH · 10.0 CVSS v2.0 Published 2013-08-09
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
100/100
Remediation priority · Urgent
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
The Intelligent Platform Management Interface (IPMI) implementation in Integrated Management Module (IMM) and Integrated Management Module II (IMM2) on IBM BladeCenter, Flex System, System x iDataPlex, and System x3### servers has a default password for the IPMI user account, which makes it easier for remote attackers to perform power-on, power-off, or reboot actions, or add or modify accounts, via unspecified vectors.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

IBM's Integrated Management Module (IMM) and IMM2 implementations on BladeCenter, Flex System, and System x servers contain a hardcoded default password for the IPMI user account. Attackers with network access to the IPMI BMC can authenticate using these default credentials to gain full administrative control, enabling them to power the server on/off, reboot, and add or modify user accounts.

MitigationImmediately change the default IPMI credentials on all affected systems to strong, unique passwords. Restrict network access to IPMI interfaces via firewall rules or VLAN isolation, and apply IBM patches when available.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
BladecenterHardware / appliance
Affected:= hs22= hs22v= hs23= hs23e= hx5
Flex System X220 Compute NodeHardware / appliance
Affected:all versions
Flex System X240 Compute NodeHardware / appliance
Affected:all versions
Flex System X440 Compute NodeHardware / appliance
Affected:all versions
System X Idataplex Dx360 M2 ServerHardware / appliance
Affected:all versions
System X Idataplex Dx360 M3 ServerHardware / appliance
Affected:all versions
System X Idataplex Dx360 M4 ServerHardware / appliance
Affected:all versions
System X3100 M4Hardware / appliance
Affected:all versions

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Authentication
None
Confidentiality
Complete
Integrity
Complete
Availability
Complete

AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify the server model
    Check the server hardware model (BladeCenter hs22/hs22v/hs23/hx23e/hx5, Flex System X220/X240/X440, System x Idataplex Dx360 M2/M3/M4, or System X3100 M4) via BMC, BIOS, or physical labels
    Affected if The server model matches one of the affected models listed in the CVE
  2. Verify IMM/IMM2 IPMI interface is present
    Access the BMC web interface or use IPMI tools (ipmitool) to query the BMC: 'ipmitool -I open chassis status' or check for open ports 623 (UDP) on the IPMI/BMC IP address
    Affected if IMM or IMM2 firmware is present and the IPMI interface is accessible on the network
  3. Assess IPMI network exposure
    Review firewall rules, VLAN configuration, and network access controls to determine if the IPMI/BMC interface is reachable from untrusted networks or the internet
    Affected if The IPMI interface is exposed to network segments with untrusted users or is internet-accessible

A user is affected if they operate any of the listed IBM server models with IPMI/IMM enabled, where the default IPMI credentials have not been changed and the interface is network-accessible.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Immediately change the default IPMI credentials on all affected systems to strong, unique passwords. Restrict network access to IPMI interfaces via firewall rules or VLAN isolation, and apply IBM patches when available.

Fix this in Bladecenter Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation3.0 h
  • Implementation4.0 h
  • Testing2.0 h
  • Review / QA2.0 h
11.0 hours of engineering $1,980
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Scan for this in your stack

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dbcve dependency scanner

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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2013-4031 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
  • No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
  • No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data