CVE-2013-4782
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Supermicro BMC implementation allows remote attackers to bypass authentication and execute arbitrary IPMI commands by using cipher suite 0 (aka cipher zero) and an arbitrary password.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceSupermicro BMC implementations contain an authentication bypass vulnerability where cipher suite 0 (cipher zero) does not properly validate passwords, allowing remote attackers to bypass authentication and execute arbitrary IPMI commands with full administrative privileges.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify if the system has a Supermicro BMCAccess the IPMI/BMC web interface, check BIOS/UEFI settings for IPMI/BMC info, or run: 'ipmitool -I open mc info' to query the BMC. Look for Supermicro vendor information in the output.Affected if The system has a Supermicro BMC (Baseboard Management Controller) present
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Verify cipher suite 0 is enabled in BMC configurationRun 'ipmitool -I lanplus -H <BMC_IP> -u ADMIN -P ADMIN raw' commands to query cipher settings, or check BMC web interface under IPMI >> Configuration >> Authentication. Look for cipher 0 or 'cipher zero' in enabled state.Affected if Cipher suite 0 is enabled on the BMC - this is the vulnerable cipher that bypasses authentication
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Confirm BMC is network-accessibleCheck if the BMC IPMI interface is reachable on the network: ping <BMC_IP> and check port 623 (UDP) is open: 'nmap -sU -p 623 <BMC_IP>'.Affected if The BMC has an active network interface and is reachable from untrusted networks
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Check IPMI authentication settingsQuery IPMI authentication capabilities: 'ipmitool -I lanplus -H <BMC_IP> -u ADMIN -P ADMIN lan print auth' or inspect BMC web interface for authentication configuration.Affected if Authentication is set to 'none', 'straight', or cipher 0 is permitted as an authentication method
The environment is affected if it contains a Supermicro BMC with cipher suite 0 enabled and the BMC is network-accessible, allowing remote attackers to bypass authentication and execute IPMI commands with admin privileges.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpdate Supermicro BMC firmware to patched versions that disable cipher zero or properly enforce authentication; if immediate patching is not possible, restrict network access to the BMC via ACLs or network isolation.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $3,168.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2013-4782 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2013-4782 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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