CVE-2014-0721
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Cisco Unified SIP Phone 3905 with firmware before 9.4(1) allows remote attackers to obtain root access via a session on the test interface on TCP port 7870, aka Bug ID CSCuh75574.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Cisco Unified SIP Phone 3905 contains a pre-authentication command injection vulnerability in its test interface listening on TCP port 7870. Attackers can establish a session on this test interface and execute arbitrary commands with root privileges, achieving full device compromise without any credentials.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Identify the device model and firmware versionAccess the phone's web interface (if available) or use SNMP to query the device. Navigate to Device Information or Status pages to retrieve the Model Number and Firmware Version. Alternatively, use 'snmpwalk' with community string 'public' against OID 1.3.6.1.2.1.1.1 or 1.3.6.1.2.1.1.5 for system description and name.Affected if The device is a Cisco Unified SIP Phone 3905 running any firmware version (all versions are affected).
-
Check if TCP port 7870 is open on the devicePerform a TCP port scan against the device on port 7870 using nmap (nmap -p 7870 <device_ip>) or netcat (nc -zv <device_ip> 7870).Affected if TCP port 7870 is open and responding, indicating the test interface is enabled.
-
Verify network accessibility of the test interfaceReview firewall rules, VLAN configuration, and network access controls to determine if TCP port 7870 is reachable from network segments. Check if the device is directly exposed to untrusted networks or the internet.Affected if TCP port 7870 is reachable from any network segment that is not strictly trusted and isolated.
-
Confirm the test interface accepts commandsEstablish a TCP connection to port 7870 using a tool like netcat (nc <device_ip> 7870) or telnet. Observe if a command prompt or test interface menu appears without authentication being required.Affected if The test interface accepts connections and provides access without requiring any credentials.
A user is affected if they have a Cisco Unified SIP Phone 3905 with TCP port 7870 open and accessible on their network, as this indicates the vulnerable test interface is exposed.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpgrade Cisco Unified SIP Phone 3905 firmware to version 9.4(1) or later. Additionally, implement network segmentation to restrict access to TCP port 7870 from untrusted networks until the upgrade is complete.
Firmware version 9.4(1) or later
- Identify the current firmware version of the Cisco Unified SIP Phone 3905 by accessing the phone's web interface or administrative console
- Download the firmware version 9.4(1) or later from the Cisco Software Download Center (software.cisco.com)
- Access the phone's administration interface and navigate to the firmware upgrade section
- Upload and apply the firmware version 9.4(1) or later to the phone
- Verify the upgrade was successful by checking the firmware version in the phone's status page
- After upgrading, verify that the test interface on TCP port 7870 is no longer accessible or has been properly secured
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $5,600.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2014-0721 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2014-0721 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data