Spring SecurityFramework / library · VMware
CVE-2014-3527
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedWhen using the CAS Proxy ticket authentication from Spring Security 3.1 to 3.2.4 a malicious CAS Service could trick another CAS Service into authenticating a proxy ticket that was not associated. This is due to the fact that the proxy ticket authentication uses the information from the HttpServletRequest which is populated based upon untrusted information within the HTTP request. This means if there are access control restrictions on which CAS services can authenticate to one another, those restrictions can be bypassed. If users are not using CAS Proxy tickets and not basing access control decisions based upon the CAS Service, then there is no impact to users.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceIn Spring Security 3.1-3.2.4, CAS proxy ticket authentication relies on HttpServletRequest data that can be manipulated by attackers. A malicious CAS service can craft HTTP requests to bypass access control restrictions between CAS services, allowing unauthorized authentication via proxy tickets not properly associated with the requesting service.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data
Spring SecurityFramework / library
= 3.1.0= 3.1.1= 3.1.2= 3.1.3= 3.1.4= 3.2.0= 3.2.1= 3.2.2= 3.2.3= 3.2.4CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Spring Security versionExamine your project's dependency management (pom.xml, build.gradle, or the spring-security-core JAR manifest) to determine the exact version of spring-security-cas-client or spring-security-cas in useAffected if The installed version is any of: 3.1.0, 3.1.1, 3.1.2, 3.1.3, 3.1.4, 3.2.0, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3, or 3.2.4
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Verify CAS proxy authentication is enabledInspect your Spring Security configuration XML files (typically security-context.xml or similar) for CasProxySelector, CasAuthenticationFilter, or proxy ticket validation related beansAffected if CAS proxy ticket authentication (proxy granting ticket validation) is configured and active in your application
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Check how CAS service URL is extractedSearch your Spring Security configuration for how the CAS service parameter is obtained. Look for references to HttpServletRequest.getRequestURL(), getRequestURI(), or custom ServiceDetails implementations that derive the service URL from the HTTP requestAffected if The CAS service identifier is derived directly from HttpServletRequest data without additional verification against a trusted service registry
You are affected if your application runs Spring Security 3.1.0-3.2.4 AND uses CAS proxy ticket authentication where the service URL is determined from the incoming HTTP request rather than from a trusted service registry.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpgrade to Spring Security 3.2.5 or later. If upgrade is not feasible and CAS proxy tickets are not required, ensure access control decisions are not based solely on the CAS Service parameter.
Spring Security 3.2.5 or later (Spring Security 3.x line); consider migrating to Spring Security 4.x for longer-term support
- 1. Identify all applications using Spring Security versions 3.1.0 through 3.2.4 that utilize CAS proxy ticket authentication.
- 2. Upgrade Spring Security to version 3.2.5 or later, which contains the fix for the CAS proxy ticket authentication bypass vulnerability.
- 3. After upgrading, verify that CAS proxy ticket authentication functions correctly in your environment.
- 4. If unable to upgrade immediately, review CAS service access control configurations to ensure only trusted services can authenticate to each other, though this is not a complete mitigation.
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
Fix this in Spring Security
Scoped from the published advisory
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing12.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $7,616.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2014-3527 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2014-3527 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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