CVE-2016-6527
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe SmartCall Activity component in Telecom application on Samsung Note device L(5.0/5.1) and M(6.0) allows attackers to cause a denial of service (crash and reboot) or possibly gain privileges via a malformed serializable object.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceThe SmartCall Activity in Samsung's Telecom system application fails to properly validate deserialized serializable objects, allowing a malformed serializable payload to trigger either a denial of service (device crash/reboot) or potentially execute code with elevated privileges. This is an insecure deserialization vulnerability in a privileged system app on Android L and M versions.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 5.0= 5.1= 6.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm device is SamsungRun 'getprop ro.product.brand' or check Settings > About Phone > ManufacturerAffected if Device is not Samsung - vulnerability does not apply
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Verify Android version is affectedRun 'getprop ro.build.version.release' or check Settings > About Phone > Android versionAffected if Version is 5.0, 5.1, or 6.0 - within affected range
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Identify Samsung Telecom app is installedRun 'pm list packages | grep -i telecom' or 'pm list packages | grep -i phone' to find the Samsung Telecom system app packageAffected if Samsung Telecom system app (com.samsung.android.app.telephony or similar) is present
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Confirm SmartCall component existsRun 'dumpsys package <telecom_package>' and look for SmartCall or CallPlusActivity in the activity list, or check for the SmartCall serviceAffected if SmartCall Activity/component exists in the Telecom app
You are affected if the device is Samsung, runs Android 5.0/5.1/6.0, and has the SmartCall feature present in the Telecom system app.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply Samsung security firmware updates for affected Note devices (Android L 5.0/5.1 and M 6.0). Until patched, restrict device access to trusted networks and disable SmartCall features if possible to reduce attack surface.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2016-6527 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2016-6527 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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