CVE-2016-9486
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedOn Windows endpoints, the SecureConnector agent must run under the local SYSTEM account or another administrator account in order to enable full functionality of the agent. The typical configuration is for the agent to run as a Windows service under the local SYSTEM account. The SecureConnector agent runs various plugin scripts and executables on the endpoint in order to gather and report information about the host to the CounterACT management appliance. The SecureConnector agent downloads these scripts and executables as needed from the CounterACT management appliance and runs them on the endpoint. By default, these executable files are downloaded to and run from the %TEMP% directory of the currently logged on user, despite the fact that the SecureConnector agent is running as SYSTEM. Aside from the downloaded scripts, the SecureConnector agent runs a batch file with SYSTEM privileges from the temp directory of the currently logged on user. If the naming convention of this script can be derived, which is made possible by placing it in a directory to which the user has read access, it may be possible overwrite the legitimate batch file with a malicious one before SecureConnector executes it. It is possible to change this directory by setting the the configuration property config.script_run_folder.value in the local.properties configuration file on the CounterACT management appliance, however the batch file which is run does not follow this property.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Forcepoint SecureConnector agent runs as SYSTEM but downloads and executes scripts from the %TEMP% directory of the currently logged-on user. A local attacker who can derive the naming convention of a batch file (which runs with SYSTEM privileges) can overwrite it with malicious code before SecureConnector executes it, achieving privilege escalation. The config.script_run_folder.value property can change this directory but the problematic batch file does not respect this setting.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Identify if SecureConnector is installedCheck for the presence of SecureConnector service or installation directory on the system. Look for service named 'SecureConnector' or check Program Files for Forescout/Forcepoint SecureConnector folders.Affected if SecureConnector is installed and running on the system
-
Locate the local.properties configuration fileOn the CounterACT management appliance, locate the local.properties file which contains the config.script_run_folder.value property. This is typically found in the CounterACT installation directory or configuration folder.Affected if The local.properties file exists and contains the script_run_folder setting
-
Check the script_run_folder.value configurationRead the config.script_run_folder.value setting from local.properties. Verify what directory path is configured for script execution.Affected if The value is set to %TEMP%, %TEMP%\, or a user-writable temp directory path, or if the setting is missing entirely (defaulting to vulnerable behavior)
-
Inspect the actual script execution directoryExamine the directory where batch scripts are downloaded and executed by SecureConnector. On the CounterACT appliance, check if this matches a secure location or the default temp directory.Affected if Scripts are being executed from a directory writable by non-privileged users, particularly the logged-on user's TEMP directory
-
Verify directory permissions on the script execution folderCheck file system permissions on the configured script_run_folder. Verify that standard users or attacker-controlled processes cannot write or modify batch files in this location.Affected if The script execution directory allows write access to non-privileged or non-admin users
The environment is affected if SecureConnector is installed and the script_run_folder.value is either not configured, set to a temp directory, or points to a location with weak permissions that allows local users to overwrite batch files before they execute with SYSTEM privileges.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataConfigure the config.script_run_folder.value property in local.properties on the CounterACT management appliance to point to a secure directory with restricted permissions, and ensure the batch file respects this configuration path.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $1,984.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2016-9486 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2016-9486 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data