Packet TracerApplication · Cisco
CVE-2017-12313
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedAn untrusted search path (aka DLL Preload) vulnerability in the Cisco Network Academy Packet Tracer software could allow an authenticated, local attacker to execute arbitrary code via DLL hijacking if a local user with administrative privileges executes the installer in the current working directory where a crafted DLL has been placed by an attacker. The vulnerability is due to incomplete input validation of path and file names of a DLL file before it is loaded. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by creating a malicious DLL file and installing it in a specific system directory. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute commands on the underlying Microsoft Windows host with privileges equivalent to the SYSTEM account. An attacker would need valid user credentials to exploit this vulnerability.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceA DLL preloading vulnerability in Cisco Network Academy Packet Tracer allows an authenticated local attacker with administrative privileges to execute arbitrary code by placing a crafted malicious DLL in the current working directory where the installer is executed. The installer loads the DLL without proper validation of the path, enabling privilege escalation to SYSTEM level.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data
Packet TracerApplication
all versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- High
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Verify Cisco Packet Tracer installationCheck for Packet Tracer installation directory (typical paths: C:\Program Files\Cisco Packet Tracer or C:\Program Files (x86)\Cisco Packet Tracer). Also check for PacketTracer.exe in typical installation locations.Affected if Cisco Packet Tracer is installed on the system, making it a potential target for this DLL preloading flaw.
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Inspect installation directory for unexpected DLL filesList all DLL files in the Packet Tracer installation directory. Compare against known legitimate DLLs expected in a standard installation (e.g., Qt DLLs, network libraries). Look for DLLs with suspicious names, double extensions, or that appear out of place.Affected if Unexpected or unauthorized DLL files exist in the installation directory, indicating possible DLL preloading attempt.
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Check current working directories for suspicious DLLsExamine directories from which Packet Tracer installer or related executables are commonly launched. Look for any DLL files that match common DLL names (e.g., wsock32.dll, version.dll, user32.dll) placed in these directories.Affected if Malicious DLLs are present in directories where Packet Tracer executables run, which could be exploited via DLL preloading.
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Review process behavior during installation or executionMonitor Packet Tracer processes using process monitoring tools (e.g., Process Monitor from Sysinternals) to observe DLL load attempts. Check if DLLs are being loaded from the current working directory instead of system directories.Affected if DLLs are being loaded from the current working directory rather than legitimate system or application paths.
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Audit user privileges on the systemCheck if standard users have administrative privileges or write access to directories where Packet Tracer is installed or commonly run from. Use 'net user' or Local Users and Groups management to enumerate accounts with admin rights.Affected if Untrusted users have administrative privileges or write access to directories used for Packet Tracer execution, enabling privilege escalation.
A system is affected if Cisco Packet Tracer is installed and either unexpected DLLs exist in installation or run directories, or untrusted users have privileges that could enable DLL preloading exploitation.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply vendor patches from Cisco when available; until patched, ensure users never run the installer from untrusted or shared directories, and implement DLL search order hardening via registry controls to prevent untrusted path loading.
Fix this in Packet Tracer
Scoped from the published advisory
- Consultation1.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing1.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $1,424.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2017-12313 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2017-12313 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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