CVE-2017-12337
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA vulnerability in the upgrade mechanism of Cisco collaboration products based on the Cisco Voice Operating System software platform could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to gain unauthorized, elevated access to an affected device. The vulnerability occurs when a refresh upgrade (RU) or Prime Collaboration Deployment (PCD) migration is performed on an affected device. When a refresh upgrade or PCD migration is completed successfully, an engineering flag remains enabled and could allow root access to the device with a known password. If the vulnerable device is subsequently upgraded using the standard upgrade method to an Engineering Special Release, service update, or a new major release of the affected product, this vulnerability is remediated by that action. Note: Engineering Special Releases that are installed as COP files, as opposed to the standard upgrade method, do not remediate this vulnerability. An attacker who can access an affected device over SFTP while it is in a vulnerable state could gain root access to the device. This access could allow the attacker to compromise the affected system completely. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCvg22923, CSCvg55112, CSCvg55128, CSCvg55145, CSCvg58619, CSCvg64453, CSCvg64456, CSCvg64464, CSCvg64475, CSCvg68797.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceA post-upgrade vulnerability in Cisco collaboration products (Voice OS) leaves an engineering flag enabled after refresh upgrade (RU) or Prime Collaboration Deployment (PCD) migration completes. This flag allows root access using a known password. The vulnerability persists until a standard upgrade method (not COP file installation) is applied to the affected device. Attackers with SFTP access to a vulnerable device can gain full root control.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify affected productDetermine if the system runs one of the affected Cisco collaboration products: Emergency Responder, Finesse, Hosted Collaboration Solution, Mediasense, Prime License Manager, Socialminer, Unified Communications Manager, or Unified Communications Manager IM and Presence Service. Check the installed product via CLI (utils system product) or admin web interface.Affected if The device runs any of the listed products.
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Check for recent Refresh Upgrade (RU) or PCD migrationReview system upgrade history and logs to determine if a Refresh Upgrade or Prime Collaboration Deployment migration was performed. Check CLI commands such as 'show version' or 'show upgrade history' for evidence of RU or PCD migration events.Affected if The device underwent an RU or PCD migration and has NOT subsequently received a standard upgrade (non-COP file) to an Engineering Special Release, service update, or new major release.
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Detect engineering flag presenceExamine system configuration files or run diagnostic commands to identify if the engineering flag remains enabled. This may be visible in system configuration, OS-level settings, or via CLI commands that display engineering or debug flags.Affected if The engineering flag is present and enabled on the system after an RU or PCD migration.
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Verify SFTP access configurationCheck SFTP access settings and permissions on the device. Review the device's service configuration to determine if SFTP (SSH File Transfer Protocol) is enabled and accessible.Affected if SFTP access is enabled and exposed, allowing an attacker to leverage the known password to gain root access.
A user is affected if their Cisco collaboration device is one of the listed products AND has undergone an RU or PCD migration without a subsequent standard (non-COP) upgrade AND the engineering flag remains enabled on the system.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataOrganizations should identify devices that underwent RU or PCD migration, then perform a standard upgrade to an Engineering Special Release, service update, or new major release (NOT COP file installation) to remove the persistent engineering flag. SFTP access should be restricted in the interim.
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- Implementation12.0 h
- Testing8.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2017-12337 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2017-12337 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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