CVE-2017-17428
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedCavium Nitrox SSL, Nitrox V SSL, and TurboSSL software development kits (SDKs) allow remote attackers to decrypt TLS ciphertext data by leveraging a Bleichenbacher RSA padding oracle, aka a ROBOT attack.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThis vulnerability is a Bleichenbacher RSA padding oracle (ROBOT attack) in Cavium Nitrox SSL, Nitrox V SSL, and TurboSSL SDKs. Attackers can decrypt TLS ciphertext by sending specially crafted RSA-encrypted messages and analyzing whether the server returns padding errors, exploiting timing differences in RSA decryption operations.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 7.24.1= t31= t32= 3.0\(0\)a5\(2.0\)= 3.0\(0\)a5\(3.0\)= 3.0\(0\)a5\(3.5\)= 3.0\(0\)a5\(2.0\)= 3.0\(0\)a5\(3.0\)= 3.0\(0\)a5\(3.5\)= 9.1\(7.16\)= 9.1\(7.16\)= 9.1\(7.16\)= 9.1\(7.16\)CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- High
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify device model and firmware versionAccess the device console or admin interface and run 'show version' or check the firmware version in the system information page. For Cisco ACE devices, use 'show version' or check the firmware loaded. For ASA devices, use 'show version' or check in the ASDM interface.Affected if The firmware version matches any of these: Cisco Webex Connect Im 7.24.1, Webex Meetings t31 or t32, Ace4710 firmware 3.0(0)a5(2.0), 3.0(0)a5(3.0), or 3.0(0)a5(3.5), Ace30 firmware 3.0(0)a5(2.0), 3.0(0)a5(3.0), or 3.0(0)a5(3.5), ASA 5510/5520/5540/5550 firmware 9.1(7.16)
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Determine if RSA key exchange is enabled in TLS configurationCheck the SSL/TLS configuration on the device. For Cisco ACE, use 'show ssl proxy config' or similar SSL configuration commands. For ASA, check the SSL cipher configuration via 'show ssl' commands or in the configuration.Affected if RSA key exchange ciphersuites (such as TLS_RSA_WITH_* ciphers) are enabled or configured as allowed in the TLS settings
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Check for Cavium Nitrox SSL SDK usageReview the system documentation or examine the SSL/TLS library information on the device. For Webex products, check the about or version information for references to Cavium Nitrox SSL, Nitrox V SSL, or TurboSSL SDK.Affected if The device uses Cavium Nitrox SSL, Nitrox V SSL, or TurboSSL SDK for TLS operations and the firmware version is in the affected list
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Verify TLS listening servicesIdentify all TLS-enabled services on the device by checking listening ports and their SSL/TLS configuration. Use commands like 'show ssl' on Cisco devices to list SSL endpoints.Affected if The device exposes TLS services using RSA key exchange and is running a vulnerable firmware version
A user is affected if the device runs one of the listed firmware versions AND has RSA key exchange ciphersuites enabled in the TLS configuration.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpdate to patched versions of the affected SDKs, or disable RSA key exchange and configure TLS to use only ephemeral (EC)DHE key exchange ciphersuites.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2017-17428 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2017-17428 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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