CVE-2018-0301
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA vulnerability in the NX-API feature of Cisco NX-OS Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to craft a packet to the management interface on an affected system, causing a buffer overflow. The vulnerability is due to incorrect input validation in the authentication module of the NX-API subsystem. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted HTTP or HTTPS packet to the management interface of an affected system with the NX-API feature enabled. An exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary code as root. Note: NX-API is disabled by default. This vulnerability affects: MDS 9000 Series Multilayer Switches, Nexus 2000 Series Fabric Extenders, Nexus 3000 Series Switches, Nexus 3500 Platform Switches, Nexus 5500 Platform Switches, Nexus 5600 Platform Switches, Nexus 6000 Series Switches, Nexus 7000 Series Switches, Nexus 7700 Series Switches, Nexus 9000 Series Switches in standalone NX-OS mode, Nexus 9500 R-Series Line Cards and Fabric Modules. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCvd45804, CSCve02322, CSCve02412.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceA buffer overflow vulnerability in the NX-API feature of Cisco NX-OS Software exists due to incorrect input validation in the authentication module. An unauthenticated remote attacker can send crafted HTTP/HTTPS packets to the management interface of affected systems with NX-API enabled, potentially executing arbitrary code with root privileges.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data>= 6.0, < 7.3\(3\)n1\(1\)>= 7.2, < 7.3\(2\)d1\(1\)>= 8.0, < 8.1\(1\)= 8.1= 8.2< 7.0\(3\)i4>= 7.0\(3\)i5, < 7.0\(3\)i7\(1\)= 7.0\(3\)i7>= 7.3, < 7.3\(3\)n1\(1\)= 6.0= 7.0= 7.1CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Verify NX-API is enabledRun the command 'show nxapi' or 'show feature | include nxapi' on the Cisco NX-OS device to check if the NX-API feature is enabledAffected if NX-API status shows as 'enabled' - the vulnerability only affects systems with NX-API turned on
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Check NX-OS versionRun the command 'show version' on the Cisco NX-OS device to obtain the installed software versionAffected if The version falls within the affected ranges: 6.0, 7.0, 7.1, 7.0(3)i4, 7.0(3)i5 through 7.0(3)i7(1), 7.2 through 7.3(2)d1(1), 7.3 through 7.3(3)n1(1), 8.0 through 8.1(1), or 8.2
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Confirm management interface accessReview the NX-API configuration by running 'show run nxapi' to see if the management interface is configured for NX-API accessAffected if NX-API is bound to the management interface (typically eth0 or mgmt0) and is reachable from untrusted networks
A system is affected if NX-API is enabled AND the NX-OS version matches one of the listed vulnerable versions, regardless of management interface network exposure since the attack targets the management interface.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped7.07.38.1
Ensure NX-API remains disabled (default state) until the appropriate Cisco firmware update is applied. If NX-API is required, upgrade to a patched version and restrict management interface access to trusted networks.
NX-OS 7.3(3)n1(1) or later for n1 platforms; 7.3(2)d1(1) or later for d1 platforms; 8.1(1) or later (preferably latest 8.x stable)
- 1. Verify NX-API is currently enabled on the affected system using the 'show nx-api' command.
- 2. If NX-API is enabled and not needed, disable it using 'no nx-api' in configuration mode to eliminate the attack surface as an immediate mitigation.
- 3. Identify the current NX-OS version using 'show version' command.
- 4. Determine the appropriate upgrade path based on current version branch (6.x, 7.x, or 8.x).
- 5. Download the fixed NX-OS image from Cisco (see tools.cisco.com for your specific hardware model).
- 6. For version 6.0 to 7.2: Upgrade to NX-OS 7.3(3)n1(1) or later for n1 platform, or 7.3(2)d1(1) or later for d1 platform.
- 7. For version 7.2 to 7.3: Upgrade to NX-OS 7.3(3)n1(1) or later, or 7.3(2)d1(1) or later.
- 8. For version 8.0.x: Upgrade to NX-OS 8.1(1) or later, preferably the latest 8.x stable release.
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2018-0301 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2018-0301 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
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