Nx OsOperating system · Cisco
CVE-2024-20399
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA vulnerability in the CLI of Cisco NX-OS Software could allow an authenticated user in possession of Administrator credentials to execute arbitrary commands as root on the underlying operating system of an affected device. This vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of arguments that are passed to specific configuration CLI commands. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by including crafted input as the argument of an affected configuration CLI command. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system with the privileges of root. Note: To successfully exploit this vulnerability on a Cisco NX-OS device, an attacker must have Administrator credentials. The following Cisco devices already allow administrative users to access the underlying operating system through the bash-shell feature, so, for these devices, this vulnerability does not grant any additional privileges: Nexus 3000 Series Switches Nexus 7000 Series Switches that are running Cisco NX-OS Software releases 8.1(1) and later Nexus 9000 Series Switches in standalone NX-OS mode
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceAuthenticated administrator users can execute arbitrary root commands on the underlying OS due to insufficient argument validation in specific Cisco NX-OS configuration CLI commands. The attacker needs valid Administrator credentials and must inject crafted input via affected configuration commands.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data
Nx OsOperating system
= 6.2\(2\)= 6.2\(2a\)= 6.2\(6\)= 6.2\(6a\)= 6.2\(6b\)= 6.2\(8\)= 6.2\(8a\)= 6.2\(8b\)= 6.2\(10\)= 6.2\(12\)= 6.2\(14\)= 6.2\(16\)CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- High
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Check NX-OS versionExecute 'show version' in the NX-OS CLI and locate the 'NX-OS' or 'system: version' lineAffected if The displayed version matches any of: 6.2(2), 6.2(2a), 6.2(6), 6.2(6a), 6.2(6b), 6.2(8), 6.2(8a), 6.2(8b), 6.2(10), 6.2(12), 6.2(14), or 6.2(16)
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Verify Administrator role existsExecute 'show user' or 'show privilege' to confirm the current session or existing users have Administrator-level permissionsAffected if Any user with Administrator role is configured or currently logged in
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Confirm bash-shell is not pre-enabledFor Nexus 3000, 7000, and 9000 models, check if bash-shell is already enabled for admin users via 'show running-config | include shell' or 'feature bash-shell'Affected if The device is NOT a Nexus 3000, 7000, or 9000 model with bash-shell already enabled - in these cases the vuln provides no additional privilege escalation
You are affected if your device runs NX-OS version 6.2(2) through 6.2(16) AND has an Administrator-level user account, unless you are on a Nexus 3000/7000/9000 with bash-shell already enabled for admin access.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply Cisco-provided patches for CVE-2024-20399; restrict Administrator access and audit existing admin accounts; consider disabling bash-shell if not required (note: some Nexus platforms already allow admin OS access, so impact is limited on those devices).
Fix this in Nx Os
Exploited in the wild — priority engagement
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $3,408.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2024-20399 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-20399 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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