CVE-2018-14999
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Leagoo P1 device with a build fingerprint of sp7731c_1h10_32v4_bird:6.0/MRA58K/android.20170629.214736:user/release-keys contains a pre-installed platform app with a package name of com.wtk.factory (versionCode=1, versionName=1.0) that contains an exported broadcast receiver named com.wtk.factory.MMITestReceiver allows any app co-located on the device to programmatically initiate a factory reset. In addition, the app initiating the factory reset does not require any permissions. A factory reset will remove all user data and apps from the device. This will result in the loss of any data that have not been backed up or synced externally. The capability to perform a factory reset is not directly available to third-party apps (those that the user installs themselves with the exception of enabled Mobile Device Management (MDM) apps), although this capability can be obtained by leveraging an unprotected app component of a pre-installed platform app.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Leagoo P1 device contains a pre-installed platform app (com.wtk.factory v1.0) with an exported broadcast receiver (com.wtk.factory.MMITestReceiver) that allows any application on the device to trigger a factory reset without any permissions. This unprotected component can be invoked by any app to completely wipe all user data and installed applications.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify device modelCheck if the device is a Leagoo P1 by reviewing the device Settings > About Phone > Model or by running 'getprop ro.product.model' in ADB shellAffected if Device model shows as Leagoo P1 or P1
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Check for vulnerable app presenceRun 'pm list packages | grep wtk.factory' in ADB shell or check Settings > Apps for com.wtk.factoryAffected if The package com.wtk.factory is installed on the device
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Verify exported broadcast receiverRun 'pm dump com.wtk.factory | grep -A 20 MMITestReceiver' in ADB shell to inspect the receiver configurationAffected if The output shows android:exported=true or no android:exported attribute (defaults to true) for the MMITestReceiver component
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Confirm receiver action nameRun 'pm dump com.wtk.factory | grep -B 5 MMITestReceiver' to find the intent filter action (typically android.intent.action.MASTER_CLEAR or similar factory reset intent)Affected if An intent-filter action for factory reset is defined and the receiver is exported
The device is affected if it is a Leagoo P1 with the com.wtk.factory app installed and the MMITestReceiver broadcast receiver is exported (android:exported not set to false), allowing any app to trigger a factory reset.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataRemove or disable the exported broadcast receiver in the com.wtk.factory app by setting android:exported='false' or requiring a protected permission; distribute via firmware OTA update. As an interim measure, enterprise environments may deploy MDM policies to detect or restrict devices with this vulnerability.
- Consultation8.0 h
- Implementation16.0 h
- Testing12.0 h
- Review / QA6.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2018-14999 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2018-14999 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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