Prime CollaborationApplication · Cisco
CVE-2018-15389
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA vulnerability in the install function of Cisco Prime Collaboration Provisioning (PCP) could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to access the administrative web interface using a default hard-coded username and password that are used during install. The vulnerability is due to a hard-coded password that, in some cases, is not replaced with a unique password. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to access the administrative web interface with administrator-level privileges.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceCisco Prime Collaboration Provisioning contains a hard-coded default credential vulnerability in its install function. During installation, default admin credentials are created that are not always replaced with unique passwords, allowing unauthenticated remote attackers to gain administrative access to the web interface.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data
Prime CollaborationApplication
= 12.1CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify installed Cisco Prime Collaboration versionAccess the server hosting Cisco Prime Collaboration and check the installed version through the application UI (typically found in Help > About) or by querying the application directories and version filesAffected if The installed version is Cisco Prime Collaboration 12.1 (the only version listed as affected)
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Verify default admin account statusLog into the Cisco Prime Collaboration web interface using the default administrator credentials (typically admin/admin or administrator/default password patterns used during initial setup)Affected if Default credentials such as admin/admin successfully grant administrative access, indicating the default password was never changed
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Check for active default credentialsUse the web interface or administrative console to list all user accounts and verify whether any account still uses a default or known default password patternAffected if An administrator-level account exists with credentials that match the known default credential set
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Review admin access logsExamine Cisco Prime Collaboration authentication and access logs for successful administrative logins from unexpected IP addresses or at unusual timesAffected if Multiple administrative logins are recorded from IP addresses not assigned to legitimate administrators, suggesting unauthorized access via default credentials
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Confirm web interface accessibilityTest whether the Cisco Prime Collaboration web interface is exposed to untrusted networks and accessible without VPN or proper network segmentationAffected if The administrative web interface is reachable from untrusted networks without multi-factor authentication enabled
Your environment is affected if Cisco Prime Collaboration version 12.1 is installed and default administrator credentials have not been replaced with unique passwords, allowing potential unauthorized administrative access.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply the vendor patch from Cisco and ensure any default credentials are replaced with strong, unique passwords during or after installation.
Fix this in Prime Collaboration
Scoped from the published advisory
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $3,168.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2018-15389 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2018-15389 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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