CVE-2018-15478
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedAn issue was discovered in myStrom WiFi Switch V1 before 2.66, WiFi Switch V2 before 3.80, WiFi Switch EU before 3.80, WiFi Bulb before 2.58, WiFi LED Strip before 3.80, WiFi Button before 2.73, and WiFi Button Plus before 2.73. The process of registering a device with a cloud account was based on an activation code derived from the device MAC address. By guessing valid MAC addresses or using MAC addresses printed on devices in shops and reverse engineering the protocol, an attacker would have been able to register previously unregistered devices to their account. When the rightful owner would have connected them after purchase to their WiFi network, the devices would not have registered with their account, would subsequently not have been controllable from the owner's mobile app, and would not have been visible in the owner's account. Instead, they would have been under control of the attacker.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe myStrom WiFi devices use a flawed activation mechanism where the cloud registration code is derived from the device MAC address rather than using cryptographically secure random values. An attacker can predict valid activation codes by guessing or obtaining MAC addresses (from devices in retail packaging), allowing them to register ownership of devices before the legitimate purchaser connects them to their network.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 2.66< 3.80< 2.73< 2.73< 3.80< 2.58< 3.80CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- High
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify your myStrom device modelLocate the specific myStrom product (Wifi Switch, Wifi Switch EU, Wifi Button Plus, Wifi Button, Wifi Bulb, or Wifi LED Strip) - check the device label, packaging, or management interfaceAffected if The device is any of these six models and the firmware version is below the fixed release
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Determine the installed firmware versionAccess the device's web interface, mobile app, or use the manufacturer's API to query the current firmware version. The exact method varies by device but is typically found in Settings > Device Info or similar.Affected if The firmware version cannot be determined or is below 2.66/2.73/2.58/3.80 depending on the model
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Compare firmware version against vulnerable rangesCheck the installed version against these thresholds: Wifi Switch < 2.66 or < 3.80; Wifi Switch EU < 3.80; Wifi Button Plus < 2.73; Wifi Button < 2.73; Wifi Bulb < 2.58; Wifi LED Strip < 3.80Affected if The installed version falls within any of these vulnerable ranges
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Verify the activation code generation method (if accessible)If you have access to device logs, firmware analysis tools, or API responses during activation, examine whether the registration code appears derivable from the MAC address (e.g., the code matches or closely correlates with the device's MAC address)Affected if The activation code shows direct correlation with the device MAC address rather than appearing as a random value
A user is affected if they own any of the six myStrom device models and the installed firmware version is below 2.66/2.73/2.58/3.80 respectively, meaning the device uses MAC-derived activation codes that can be predicted by an attacker.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor data2.582.662.73
The vendor should implement a secure activation mechanism using cryptographically random, device-specific secrets rather than MAC-derived codes. Users should ensure their devices are updated to the patched firmware versions (v2.66/3.80/2.58/2.73 and above) once released.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing5.0 h
- Review / QA3.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2018-15478 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2018-15478 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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