CVE-2018-15480
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedAn issue was discovered in myStrom WiFi Switch V1 before 2.66, WiFi Switch V2 before 3.80, WiFi Switch EU before 3.80, WiFi Bulb before 2.58, WiFi LED Strip before 3.80, WiFi Button before 2.73, and WiFi Button Plus before 2.73. The cloud API had a hidden parameter, which allowed an authenticated user to reconfigure the server URL for a device registered to their account. In combination with an insecure device registration vulnerability, this allowed an attacker to reconfigure a maliciously registered device to their own rogue replica of the myStrom API and issue commands to the device, including firmware update commands.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceThe myStrom cloud API contains a hidden parameter allowing authenticated users to reconfigure the server URL for devices registered to their account. When combined with an insecure device registration vulnerability, attackers can register a malicious device and redirect it to a rogue API server, enabling command injection including firmware updates.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 2.66< 3.80< 2.73< 2.73< 3.80< 2.58< 3.80CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify myStrom device models in your environmentInventory all myStrom devices (Wifi Switch, Wifi Button, Wifi Button Plus, Wifi Switch EU, Wifi Bulb, Wifi LED Strip) by reviewing your myStrom cloud account, network DHCP leases, or physical device labelsAffected if Any of these device models are present in the environment
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Retrieve firmware version from each deviceUse the myStrom mobile app to check device details, or query the device directly via its local API at http://<device-ip>/api/info to obtain the firmware version fieldAffected if Firmware version is below 2.66 for Wifi Switch, below 3.80 for Wifi Switch EU or LED Strip, below 2.73 for Button/Button Plus, or below 2.58 for Bulb
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Inspect cloud API device configurationLog into the myStrom cloud management portal and review each device's registered server URL configuration. Look for any unexpected or user-modifiable server endpoint fields in the device settings API responsesAffected if The API exposes a parameter that allows modification of the device server URL for devices registered to your account
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Verify device registration securityExamine the device registration process in the cloud API by reviewing API request/response traffic when adding a new device. Check if the registration mechanism validates ownership or allows arbitrary device hijackingAffected if The device registration endpoint does not properly validate that the registering user owns the device serial number, allowing unauthorized device registration
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Check for rogue API server assignmentsQuery each device's current server configuration via the local API endpoint /api/info or through the cloud API, and verify all server URLs point to the official myStrom cloud endpoints (*.mystrom.ch or *.mystrom.com)Affected if Any device is configured to connect to a server URL other than the official myStrom cloud infrastructure
A user is affected if any myStrom device runs firmware below the fixed versions AND the cloud API allows modification of device server URLs without proper ownership validation.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor data2.582.662.73
Update firmware to the fixed versions (V1>=2.66, V2/EU/LED Strip>=3.80, Bulb>=2.58, Button/Button Plus>=2.73) and remediate the insecure device registration in the cloud API.
- Consultation8.0 h
- Implementation24.0 h
- Testing16.0 h
- Review / QA8.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2018-15480 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2018-15480 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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