CVE-2018-20321
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedAn issue was discovered in Rancher 2 through 2.1.5. Any project member with access to the default namespace can mount the netes-default service account in a pod, and then use that pod to execute administrative privileged commands against the k8s cluster. This could be mitigated by isolating the default namespace in a separate project, where only cluster admins can be given permissions to access. As of 2018-12-20, this bug affected ALL clusters created or imported by Rancher.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThis is a privilege escalation vulnerability in Rancher 2 (versions through 2.1.5) where any project member with access to the default namespace can mount the netes-default service account in a pod. This allows the attacker to execute administrative privileged commands against the underlying Kubernetes cluster by leveraging the elevated permissions of the default service account.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data>= 2.0.0, <= 2.1.5CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Rancher versionCheck the installed Rancher version in the UI under 'About Rancher' or via the API endpoint /meta/rancher/identity. Compare the version number against the affected range: >= 2.0.0 and <= 2.1.5Affected if Rancher version is 2.0.0 through 2.1.5 inclusive
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Verify project membership with default namespace accessIn Rancher UI, navigate to the target cluster and check which projects non-cluster-admin users belong to. For each project, inspect the namespace members under 'Resources' > 'Namespaces' to see if the default namespace is accessible to project membersAffected if Any project member (non-cluster-admin) has been granted access to the default namespace in their project
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Confirm pod creation capability in default namespaceAs a project member, attempt to create a test pod or deploy a workload in the default namespace. Verify whether the user can submit pod specs through the Rancher UI or kubectl via the project's kubeconfigAffected if Project members can create pods in the default namespace
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Check service account mounting optionWhen creating a pod/deployment in the default namespace via Rancher, inspect the pod spec form or YAML to see if the 'Service Account' field is editable or if the default service account can be specified in the pod specAffected if Users can specify or retain the default service account when creating pods in the default namespace
The environment is affected if running Rancher 2.0.0-2.1.5 AND project members have access to create pods in the default namespace where they can leverage the netes-default service account for privilege escalation.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataIsolate the default namespace in a separate Rancher project where only cluster administrators have access permissions, preventing project members from mounting privileged service accounts.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation6.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2018-20321 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2018-20321 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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