CVE-2018-20509
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe print_binder_ref_olocked function in drivers/android/binder.c in the Linux kernel 4.14.90 allows local users to obtain sensitive address information by reading " ref *desc *node" lines in a debugfs file.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe print_binder_ref_olocked function in the Linux kernel's Android binder driver (4.14.90) exposes sensitive kernel memory addresses through debugfs output. Local users can read 'ref *desc *node' lines in the debugfs file to obtain pointer values, aiding in exploitation of other kernel vulnerabilities.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 4.14.90CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Check kernel versionRun 'uname -r' to see the running kernel versionAffected if Version is exactly 4.14.90 (only this specific version is affected)
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Verify debugfs is mountedRun 'mount | grep debugfs' to see if debugfs is currently mountedAffected if debugfs is mounted and readable by unprivileged users
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Check for binder debugfs entriesList contents of /sys/kernel/debug/binder/ (or /d/binder/ if debugfs is mounted elsewhere) using 'ls -la'Affected if Binder debugfs directory exists and contains 'ref *desc *node' files readable by non-root users
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Inspect binder debugfs output for addressesRead files in the binder debugfs directory (e.g., 'cat /sys/kernel/debug/binder/refs/*') and look for hex pointer values in lines matching 'ref *desc *node' patternAffected if Output contains kernel memory pointer addresses rather than sanitized placeholder values
You are affected if running kernel version 4.14.90 with the Android binder driver enabled and debugfs mounted with world-readable access that exposes raw pointer addresses in binder reference output.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataRestrict debugfs access to privileged users or apply the kernel security patch that removes address information from the binder debugfs output.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $5,120.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2018-20509 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2018-20509 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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