CVE-2018-4833
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA vulnerability has been identified in RFID 181EIP (All versions), RUGGEDCOM Win (V4.4, V4.5, V5.0, and V5.1), SCALANCE X-200 switch family (incl. SIPLUS NET variants) (All versions < V5.2.3), SCALANCE X-200IRT switch family (incl. SIPLUS NET variants) (All versions < V5.4.1), SCALANCE X-200RNA switch family (All versions < V3.2.6), SCALANCE X-300 switch family (incl. SIPLUS NET variants) (All versions < V4.1.3), SCALANCE X408 (All versions < V4.1.3), SCALANCE X414 (All versions), SIMATIC RF182C (All versions). Unprivileged remote attackers located in the same local network segment (OSI Layer 2) could gain remote code execution on the affected products by sending a specially crafted DHCP response to a client's DHCP request.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe vulnerability allows unprivileged remote attackers on the same local network segment (Layer 2) to achieve remote code execution by sending specially crafted DHCP responses to client DHCP requests. The affected Siemens industrial networking products (RFID readers, RUGGEDCOM Win, SCALANCE switches, and SIMATIC RF182C) lack proper validation of DHCP responses, enabling injection of malicious responses that can trigger code execution.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versions= 4.4= 4.5< 5.2.3< 5.4.1all versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Adjacent
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.0/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the device modelLog into the device or check the physical device label/web interface to determine the exact model (e.g., RFID 181 EIP, RUGGEDCOM Wimax, SCALANCE X200, SCALANCE X200IRT, SCALANCE X204RNA, SCALANCE X300, SCALANCE X408, SCALANCE X414)Affected if The device is one of these Siemens industrial networking models: RFID 181 EIP, RUGGEDCOM Wimax, SCALANCE X200, SCALANCE X200IRT, SCALANCE X204RNA, SCALANCE X300, SCALANCE X408, or SCALANCE X414
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Determine the firmware versionAccess the device web interface, CLI, or management console and locate the firmware version information. For RUGGEDCOM Wimax, check if version is 4.4 or 4.5. For SCALANCE X200, compare version against 5.2.3. For SCALANCE X200IRT, compare version against 5.4.1. For other models, any version is affected.Affected if The device runs: RFID 181 EIP (any version), RUGGEDCOM Wimax (= 4.4 or = 4.5), SCALANCE X200 (< 5.2.3), SCALANCE X200IRT (< 5.4.1), SCALANCE X204RNA (any version), SCALANCE X300 (any version), SCALANCE X408 (any version), or SCALANCE X414 (any version)
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Verify DHCP client is enabledCheck the device network configuration settings to determine if DHCP client mode is active for IP address assignment. Look for DHCP enabled in the network settings, IP configuration, or LAN/DHCP client settings.Affected if DHCP client is enabled on the device - the vulnerability is only exploitable when the device requests IP addresses via DHCP from the local network segment
You are affected if you have a listed Siemens industrial networking device with a vulnerable firmware version AND DHCP client is enabled, because the attacker must be on the same Layer 2 network segment to inject malicious DHCP responses.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor data5.2.35.4.1
Isolate affected devices on dedicated network segments or VLANs to prevent Layer 2 attacks; where possible, implement static IP addressing or DHCP authentication to eliminate the attack surface. Firmware updates should be applied where available (V5.2.3 for X-200, V5.4.1 for X-200IRT, V3.2.6 for X-200RNA, V4.1.3 for X-300/X408).
- Consultation6.0 h
- Implementation12.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA3.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2018-4833 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2018-4833 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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