dbcve.org
A30 FirmwareOperating system · Alcatel

CVE-2018-6597

MEDIUM · 6.8 CVSS v3.0 Published 2018-08-29
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
73/100
Remediation priority · Elevated
No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
The Alcatel A30 device with a build fingerprint of TCL/5046G/MICKEY6US:7.0/NRD90M/J63:user/release-keys contains a hidden privilege escalation capability to achieve command execution as the root user. They have made modifications that allow a user with physical access to the device to obtain a root shell via ADB. Modifying the read-only properties by an app as the system user creates a UNIX domain socket named factory_test that will execute commands as the root user by processes that have privilege to access it (as per the SELinux rules that the vendor controls).

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

The Alcatel A30 (TCL/5046G/MICKEY6US) contains a vendor-created backdoor where an app running as the system user can modify read-only properties to create a UNIX domain socket named 'factory_test'. This socket executes commands as the root user and is accessible via ADB when the device has physical access, bypassing standard SELinux restrictions through vendor-modified policies.

MitigationThis is a firmware-level backdoor requiring vendor action; enterprises should disable ADB access via MDM policies, enforce device encryption, and restrict physical access to mitigate until a vendor firmware update is available.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
A30 FirmwareOperating system
Affected:= 7.0

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Physical
Complexity
Low
Privileges
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS:3.0/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify the device model
    Check the device settings or use 'getprop ro.product.model' and 'getprop ro.product.device' via ADB to confirm the device is Alcatel A30 with model TCL/5046G or MICKEY6US
    Affected if The device model is not Alcatel A30 (TCL/5046G/MICKEY6US)
  2. Check the firmware version
    Run 'getprop ro.build.version.release' via ADB to determine the Android version. Check 'getprop ro.build.display.id' for the full firmware build identifier
    Affected if The firmware version is not Android 7.0 (Nougat)
  3. Verify ADB debugging is enabled
    On the device, go to Settings > Developer Options > Android debugging, or run 'adb devices' from a connected computer to see if the device is detected with ADB enabled
    Affected if ADB debugging is enabled and the device is accessible via USB
  4. Check for the factory_test socket
    Run 'ls -la /dev/socket/' via ADB shell to list socket files and look for 'factory_test', or attempt to connect to the socket if it exists
    Affected if A UNIX domain socket named 'factory_test' exists in /dev/socket/
  5. Verify system app can modify read-only properties
    Use 'getprop' and 'setprop' commands via ADB shell to test if a system-privileged app can change read-only system properties (which normally require root)
    Affected if A system user app can modify properties that should be read-only

The device is affected if it is an Alcatel A30 (TCL/5046G/MICKEY6US) running firmware version 7.0 with ADB enabled and the 'factory_test' socket present in /dev/socket/.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

This is a firmware-level backdoor requiring vendor action; enterprises should disable ADB access via MDM policies, enforce device encryption, and restrict physical access to mitigate until a vendor firmware update is available.

Fix this in A30 Firmware Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation2.0 h
  • Implementation4.0 h
  • Testing2.0 h
  • Review / QA1.0 h
9.0 hours of engineering $1,600
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2018-6597 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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  • No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data