CVE-2018-6598
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedAn issue was discovered on Orbic Wonder Orbic/RC555L/RC555L:7.1.2/N2G47H/329100b:user/release-keys devices. Any app co-located on the device can send an intent to factory reset the device programmatically because of com.android.server.MasterClearReceiver. This does not require any user interaction and does not require any permission to perform. A factory reset will remove all user data from the device. This will result in the loss of any data that the user has not backed up or synced externally. This capability to perform a factory reset is not directly available to third-party apps (those that the user installs themselves), although this capability is present in an unprotected component of the Android OS. This vulnerability is not present in Google's Android Open Source Project (AOSP) code. Therefore, it was introduced by Orbic or another entity in the supply chain.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Orbic Wonder (RC555L) device running Android 7.1.2 contains an unprotected MasterClearReceiver component that allows any installed application to trigger a factory reset without user consent or any permissions. This component, which is properly protected in AOSP, was made accessible to third-party apps through modifications introduced by Orbic or its supply chain, enabling trivial denial-of-service and data loss.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 7.1.2CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm device modelCheck that the device is an Orbic Wonder model RC555L. This can be verified via Settings > About Phone > Model Number, or by running 'getprop ro.product.model' in ADB shell.Affected if Device model is NOT Orbic Wonder RC555L - if different model, this specific CVE does not apply.
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Verify firmware versionConfirm the Android firmware version is exactly 7.1.2. Check via Settings > About Phone > Android version, or run 'getprop ro.build.version.release' in ADB shell.Affected if Firmware version is NOT 7.1.2 - only version 7.1.2 on the RC555L model is affected by this CVE.
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Check if MasterClearReceiver is exportedInspect the system firmware's AndroidManifest.xml for the MasterClearReceiver component declaration. Look for an intent-filter with action android.intent.action.MASTER_CLEAR that lacks a android:permission attribute requiring android.permission.MASTER_CLEAR or similar system-level permission. In ADB, use 'dumpsys package <package_name>' to enumerate exported receivers if the package is accessible.Affected if The MasterClearReceiver intent-filter is exported without a android:permission attribute - this means any installed app can send the factory reset intent without any permissions.
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Verify no permission requirement on reset intentTest whether a third-party application (without special permissions) can successfully broadcast android.intent.action.MASTER_CLEAR. Create a minimal test app that sends this intent, or inspect the receiver's exported status using 'pm dump <receiver_package>' via ADB.Affected if A non-privileged app can trigger the intent without receiving a security exception - the device is vulnerable.
A user is affected only if they are using an Orbic Wonder RC555L device running Android firmware version 7.1.2 where the MasterClearReceiver is exported without permission protection, allowing any app to trigger factory reset.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataThe MasterClearReceiver must be secured to require system-level privileges or user confirmation before executing a factory reset. This requires modifying the system service configuration or intent filter permissions in the firmware.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation16.0 h
- Testing8.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2018-6598 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2018-6598 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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