CVE-2018-6599
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedAn issue was discovered on Orbic Wonder Orbic/RC555L/RC555L:7.1.2/N2G47H/329100b:user/release-keys devices, allowing attackers to obtain sensitive information (such as text-message content) by reading a copy of the Android log on the SD card. The system-wide Android logs are not directly available to third-party apps since they tend to contain sensitive data. Third-party apps can read from the log but only the log messages that the app itself has written. Certain apps can leak data to the Android log due to not sanitizing log messages, which is in an insecure programming practice. Pre-installed system apps and apps that are signed with the framework key can read from the system-wide Android log. We found a pre-installed app on the Orbic Wonder that when started via an Intent will write the Android log to the SD card, also known as external storage, via com.ckt.mmitest.MmiMainActivity. Any app that requests the READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE permission can read from the SD card. Therefore, a local app on the device can quickly start a specific component in the pre-installed system app to have the Android log written to the SD card. Therefore, any app co-located on the device with the READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE permission can obtain the data contained within the Android log and continually monitor it and mine the log for relevant data. In addition, the default messaging app (com.android.mms) writes the body of sent and received text messages to the Android log, as well as the recipient phone number for sent text messages and the sending phone number for received text messages. In addition, any call data contains phone numbers for sent and received calls.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceA pre-installed system app (com.ckt.mmitest.MmiMainActivity) on Orbic Wonder devices writes the entire system-wide Android log to external storage (SD card) when triggered via Intent. Combined with the default messaging app (com.android.mms) leaking SMS content and phone numbers to the log, any malicious app with READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE permission can read this exposed log and harvest sensitive communications.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 7.1= 7.1.2CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify device modelGo to Settings > About Phone and verify the model number is Orbic Wonder RC555lAffected if Device model is Orbic Wonder RC555l with firmware 7.1 or 7.1.2
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Check firmware versionNavigate to Settings > About Phone > Android version or Build number to confirm the installed firmware versionAffected if Firmware version equals 7.1 or 7.1.2 exactly
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Verify vulnerable app existsUse an app inspector or ADB command 'pm list packages' to check if package com.ckt.mmitest.MmiMainActivity is installed on the deviceAffected if The package com.ckt.mmitest.MmiMainActivity is present on the device
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Check for exposed log fileUsing a file manager or ADB, examine the external storage (SD card) root directory for any log files (such as logcat logs) that may contain system-wide Android logsAffected if Log files containing system information are found on external storage accessible by other apps
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Verify messaging app permissionsCheck the permissions granted to the default messaging app (com.android.mms) and examine if it has permission to write to logsAffected if The messaging app has excessive permissions and the device is running the vulnerable firmware version
A user is affected if they are using an Orbic Wonder RC555l device with firmware version 7.1 or 7.1.2, and the vulnerable com.ckt.mmitest.MmiMainActivity app is present, allowing sensitive SMS data to be exposed via log files on external storage.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataRemove or secure the vulnerable pre-installed logging app (com.ckt.mmitest.MmiMainActivity) and patch the messaging app to stop logging sensitive SMS/call data. Consider Android OS updates to further restrict system log access.
- Consultation8.0 h
- Implementation24.0 h
- Testing12.0 h
- Review / QA6.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $14,080.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2018-6599 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2018-6599 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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