dbcve.org
MyswisscomassistantApplication · Swisscom

CVE-2018-6765

HIGH · 7.8 CVSS v3.0 Published 2018-03-27
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
80/100
Remediation priority · High
Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
Swisscom MySwisscomAssistant 2.17.1.1065 contains a vulnerability that could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the targeted system. This vulnerability exists due to the way .dll files are loaded. It allows an attacker to load a .dll of the attacker's choosing that could execute arbitrary code without the user's knowledge. The specific flaw exists within the handling of several DLLs (dwmapi.dll, IPHLPAPI.DLL, WindowsCodecs.dll, RpcRtRemote.dll, CRYPTSP.dll, rasadhlp.dll, DNSAPI.dll, ntmarta.dll, netbios.dll, olepro32.dll, security.dll, winhttp.dll, WINSTA.dll) loaded by the MySwisscomAssistant_Setup.exe process.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

A DLL hijacking vulnerability exists in Swisscom MySwisscomAssistant 2.17.1.1065 where the application insecurely loads multiple DLLs (dwmapi.dll, IPHLPAPI.DLL, WindowsCodecs.dll, RpcRtRemote.dll, CRYPTSP.dll, rasadhlp.dll, DNSAPI.dll, ntmarta.dll, netbios.dll, olepro32.dll, security.dll, winhttp.dll, WINSTA.dll) without using secure paths, allowing an attacker to place a malicious DLL in a search order location to achieve arbitrary code execution.

MitigationRemediate by rebuilding the application to use full absolute paths for all DLL dependencies or implement safe DLL loading mechanisms (e.g., manifest-based loading, SetDllDirectory), ensuring the application only loads DLLs from trusted system directories.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
MyswisscomassistantApplication
Affected:= 2.17.1.1065

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Local
Complexity
Low
Privileges
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Check if Swisscom MySwisscomAssistant is installed
    Open Control Panel > Programs and Features, or run 'Get-ItemProperty HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\* | Select-Object DisplayName, DisplayVersion' in PowerShell to list installed programs
    Affected if Swisscom MySwisscomAssistant appears in the installed programs list with version 2.17.1.1065
  2. Locate the application executable
    If installed, find the main executable path. Common locations: C:\Program Files\Swisscom\MySwisscomAssistant\ or C:\Program Files (x86)\Swisscom\MySwisscomAssistant\. Use Windows Search or check the installation directory from Step 1
    Affected if The application executable (typically MySwisscomAssistant.exe or similar) exists in the found directory
  3. Verify DLL loading behavior
    Use Process Monitor from Sysinternals to monitor the application when launched. Set filter for Path contains any of: dwmapi.dll, IPHLPAPI.DLL, WindowsCodecs.dll, RpcRtRemote.dll, CRYPTSP.dll, rasadhlp.dll, DNSAPI.dll, ntmarta.dll, netbios.dll, olepro32.dll, security.dll, winhttp.dll, WINSTA.dll. Check if any are loaded from the application directory rather than Windows\System32
    Affected if Any of the listed DLLs are loaded from the application directory or a user-writable path instead of C:\Windows\System32 or C:\Windows\SysWOW64
  4. Check application directory write permissions
    Right-click the application installation directory from Step 2, select Properties > Security. Verify which users have Write or Modify permissions to that folder
    Affected if Standard users (non-admin) have Write or Modify permissions to the application directory, allowing them to place a malicious DLL

You are affected if Swisscom MySwisscomAssistant version 2.17.1.1065 is installed and the application loads any of the vulnerable DLLs (dwmapi.dll, IPHLPAPI.DLL, etc.) from its own directory or a user-writable location instead of system directories.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Remediate by rebuilding the application to use full absolute paths for all DLL dependencies or implement safe DLL loading mechanisms (e.g., manifest-based loading, SetDllDirectory), ensuring the application only loads DLLs from trusted system directories.

Fix this in Myswisscomassistant Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation3.0 h
  • Implementation12.0 h
  • Testing6.0 h
  • Review / QA3.0 h
24.0 hours of engineering $4,200
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2018-6765 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
  • No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
  • No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data