CVE-2018-6766
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedSwisscom TVMediaHelper 1.1.0.50 contains a vulnerability that could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the targeted system. This vulnerability exists due to the way .dll files are loaded. It allows an attacker to load a .dll of the attacker's choosing that could execute arbitrary code without the user's knowledge. The specific flaw exists within the handling of several DLLs (dwmapi.dll, PROPSYS.dll, cscapi.dll, SAMLIB.dll, netbios.dll, winhttp.dll, security.dll, ntmarta.dll, WindowsCodecs.dll, apphelp.dll) loaded by the SwisscomTVMediaHelper.exe process.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceSwisscom TVMediaHelper 1.1.0.50 is vulnerable to DLL hijacking due to insecure DLL loading. The application loads multiple system DLLs (dwmapi.dll, PROPSYS.dll, cscapi.dll, SAMLIB.dll, netbios.dll, winhttp.dll, security.dll, ntmarta.dll, WindowsCodecs.dll, apphelp.dll) without validating the load path, allowing an attacker to place a malicious DLL in a search path location that gets loaded before the legitimate system DLL, enabling arbitrary code execution.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 1.1.0.50CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm Swisscom TVMediaHelper installation and versionCheck the installed version of Swisscom TVMediaHelper. Common locations: C:\Program Files\Swisscom\TVMediaHelper\ or C:\Program Files (x86)\Swisscom\TVMediaHelper\. Look for TvMediaHelper.exe or similar executable and check its version property, or check Add/Remove Programs for the installed version.Affected if The installed version is exactly 1.1.0.50 (this specific version is vulnerable)
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Locate the application executable and DLL search pathsFind the full path to the TvMediaHelper executable. Use Process Explorer or Dependencies Walker while the application is running to observe which DLLs it attempts to load and from which paths.Affected if The application loads DLLs from directories writable by non-privileged users (such as the application directory or current working directory) before system directories
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Inspect application directory for suspicious DLLsExamine the Swisscom TVMediaHelper installation directory for any of the following DLLs that should not be there: dwmapi.dll, PROPSYS.dll, cscapi.dll, SAMLIB.dll, netbios.dll, winhttp.dll, security.dll, ntmarta.dll, WindowsCodecs.dll, apphelp.dll. These are Windows system DLLs that should normally load from System32.Affected if Any of these DLLs are present in the application directory (indicating potential hijacking opportunity)
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Check for DLL planting in user-writable locationsSearch common search-path directories (application directory, current working directory, directories in PATH) for files matching the vulnerable DLL names: dwmapi.dll, PROPSYS.dll, cscapi.dll, SAMLIB.dll, netbios.dll, winhttp.dll, security.dll, ntmarta.dll, WindowsCodecs.dll, apphelp.dll.Affected if These DLLs exist in directories that precede System32 in the DLL search order
A system is affected if Swisscom TVMediaHelper version 1.1.0.50 is installed and the application loads DLLs from locations that could be controlled by an attacker.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataReplace relative DLL loading with absolute paths or hardcoded system paths for all DLLs, enable Safe DLL Search Mode, and/or implement DLL verification (e.g., code signing verification) before loading. If available, apply vendor patches that address this vulnerability.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2018-6766 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2018-6766 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data