CVE-2019-13945
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA vulnerability has been identified in SIMATIC S7-1200 CPU family (incl. SIPLUS variants) (All versions), SIMATIC S7-1200 CPU family < V4.x (incl. SIPLUS variants) (All versions), SIMATIC S7-1200 CPU family V4.x (incl. SIPLUS variants) (All versions with Function State (FS) < 11), SIMATIC S7-200 SMART CPU CR20s (6ES7 288-1CR20-0AA1) (All versions <= V2.3.0 and Function State (FS) <= 3), SIMATIC S7-200 SMART CPU CR30s (6ES7 288-1CR30-0AA1) (All versions <= V2.3.0 and Function State (FS) <= 3), SIMATIC S7-200 SMART CPU CR40 (6ES7 288-1CR40-0AA0) (All versions <= V2.2.2 and Function State (FS) <= 8), SIMATIC S7-200 SMART CPU CR40s (6ES7 288-1CR40-0AA1) (All versions <= V2.3.0 and Function State (FS) <= 3), SIMATIC S7-200 SMART CPU CR60 (6ES7 288-1CR60-0AA0) (All versions <= V2.2.2 and Function State (FS) <= 10), SIMATIC S7-200 SMART CPU CR60s (6ES7 288-1CR60-0AA1) (All versions <= V2.3.0 and Function State (FS) <= 3), SIMATIC S7-200 SMART CPU SR20 (6ES7 288-1SR20-0AA0) (All versions <= V2.5.0 and Function State (FS) <= 11), SIMATIC S7-200 SMART CPU SR30 (6ES7 288-1SR30-0AA0) (All versions <= V2.5.0 and Function State (FS) <= 10), SIMATIC S7-200 SMART CPU SR40 (6ES7 288-1SR40-0AA0) (All versions <= V2.5.0 and Function State (FS) <= 10), SIMATIC S7-200 SMART CPU SR60 (6ES7 288-1SR60-0AA0) (All versions <= V2.5.0 and Function State (FS) <= 12), SIMATIC S7-200 SMART CPU ST20 (6ES7 288-1ST20-0AA0) (All versions <= V2.5.0 and Function State (FS) <= 9), SIMATIC S7-200 SMART CPU ST30 (6ES7 288-1ST30-0AA0) (All versions <= V2.5.0 and Function State (FS) <= 9), SIMATIC S7-200 SMART CPU ST40 (6ES7 288-1ST40-0AA0) (All versions <= V2.5.0 and Function State (FS) <= 8), SIMATIC S7-200 SMART CPU ST60 (6ES7 288-1ST60-0AA0) (All versions <= V2.5.0 and Function State (FS) <= 8), SIMATIC S7-200 SMART CPU family (All versions). There is an access mode used during manufacturing of the affected devices that allows additional diagnostic functionality. The security vulnerability could be exploited by an attacker with physical access to the UART interface during boot process.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceA manufacturing backdoor/diagnostic access mode exists in the UART interface of SIMATIC S7-1200 and S7-200 SMART CPU families that can be exploited by an attacker with physical access to the UART interface during the boot process, allowing unauthorized diagnostic functionality.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsall versions<= 2.5.0<= 2.5.0<= 2.5.0<= 2.5.0<= 2.5.0<= 2.5.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Physical
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify PLC model and firmware versionLocate the Siemens PLC (S7-1200 or S7-200 Smart variant ST20/ST30/ST40/ST60/SR20/SR30) and retrieve its firmware version from the device labeling, TIA Portal project, or via the device web interface if availableAffected if The device is a SIMATIC S7-1200 (any firmware) or a S7-200 Smart CPU (ST20/ST30/ST40/ST60/SR20/SR30) with firmware version 2.5.0 or lower
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Assess physical location of the PLCInspect the physical environment where the PLC is installed. Determine whether the device cabinet or enclosure is locked and whether the UART debugging port (typically a 9-pin D-sub or similar connector) is exposed or accessible without specialized toolsAffected if The PLC is installed in an unsecured or publicly accessible location where an attacker could gain physical access to the UART interface
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Verify UART port protectionExamine the PLC chassis for any external indicators of UART port protection such as port covers, removed headers, or tamper-evident seals on the debug/serial interfaceAffected if The UART/debugging port is physically exposed or unprotected, allowing connection without removing covers or tools
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Confirm boot process accessibilityDetermine whether the PLC can be powered cycled by an attacker without detection. Check if the device is in a monitored area and whether power cycles would be logged or noticedAffected if An attacker could physically power cycle the device and access the UART interface during the boot sequence without being detected
A user is affected if they have a SIMATIC S7-1200 (any version) or S7-200 Smart CPU (firmware <=2.5.0) deployed in a location where physical access to the UART interface is possible, enabling the diagnostic backdoor to be exploited.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply vendor firmware updates when available and implement physical security controls to restrict access to device UART interfaces; coordinate with Siemens for patch availability.
- Consultation8.0 h
- Implementation16.0 h
- Testing8.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $10,240.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2019-13945 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2019-13945 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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