CVE-2019-15348
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Tecno Camon Android device with a build fingerprint of TECNO/H612/TECNO-ID5a:8.1.0/O11019/F-180828V106:user/release-keys contains a pre-installed platform app with a package name of com.lovelyfont.defcontainer (versionCode=7, versionName=7.0.11). This app contains an exported service named com.lovelyfont.manager.FontCoverService that allows any app co-located on the device to supply arbitrary commands via shell script to be executed as the system user that are triggered by writing an attacker-selected message to the logcat log. This app cannot be disabled by the user and the attack can be performed by a zero-permission app. Executing commands as the system user can allow a third-party app to video record the user's screen, factory reset the device, obtain the user's notifications, read the logcat logs, inject events in the Graphical User Interface (GUI), and obtains the user's text messages, and more. Executing commands as the system user can allow a third-party app to factory reset the device, obtain the user's notifications, read the logcat logs, inject events in the GUI, change the default Input Method Editor (IME) (e.g., keyboard) with one contained within the attacking app that contains keylogging functionality, and obtains the user's text messages, and more.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Tecno Camon Android device ships with a pre-installed app (com.lovelyfont.defcontainer v7.0.11) containing an exported service (FontCoverService) that accepts arbitrary shell commands executed as the system user. The attack is triggered by writing specific messages to logcat, requiring zero permissions and cannot be disabled by the user. This grants the attacker system-level privileges enabling screen recording, factory reset, notification theft, GUI injection, IME replacement with keyloggers, and SMS exfiltration.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 8.1.0\/o11019\/f-180828v106\CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify device modelRun 'getprop ro.product.model' or check Settings > About Phone > Model number. Look for 'h612' or 'Id5a' in the model identifier.Affected if Device model is Tecno Mobile Tecno/h612/tecno Id5a
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Confirm Android versionRun 'getprop ro.build.version.release' or check Settings > About Phone > Android version. Look for '8.1.0' with build 'o11019/f-180828v106'.Affected if Android version is 8.1.0 with build identifier containing o11019/f-180828v106
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Check for malicious app installationRun 'pm list packages' or 'pm list packages -3' to list installed packages. Look for 'com.lovelyfont.defcontainer'. Use 'dumpsys package com.lovelyfont.defcontainer' to confirm version 7.0.11.Affected if Package com.lovelyfont.defcontainer version 7.0.11 is installed on the device
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Verify FontCoverService is exportedRun 'dumpsys package com.lovelyfont.defcontainer' and look for exported service components under <service> tags. The service name should be 'FontCoverService'.Affected if FontCoverService is listed as an exported component in the app manifest
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Confirm service is runningRun 'dumpsys activity services' or 'ps -A | grep defcontainer' to check if the FontCoverService process is active.Affected if The FontCoverService process is currently running on the device
A device is affected if it is a Tecno Camon Id5a (h612) running Android 8.1.0 (build o11019/f-180828v106) with the pre-installed com.lovelyfont.defcontainer v7.0.11 app containing the exported FontCoverService.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUsers cannot directly remediate this vulnerability as the malicious app cannot be disabled; the only effective mitigation is awaiting an OEM firmware update from Tecno, or replacing the device with a model without pre-installed supply chain compromises. Enterprise environments should consider device procurement policies that audit pre-installed apps.
- Consultation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2019-15348 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2019-15348 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data