CVE-2019-15349
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Tecno Camon Android device with a build fingerprint of TECNO/H612/TECNO-ID5a:8.1.0/O11019/F-180828V106:user/release-keys contains a pre-installed platform app with a package name of com.lovelyfont.defcontainer (versionCode=7, versionName=7.0.11). This app contains an exported service named com.lovelyfont.manager.service.FunctionService that allows any app co-located on the device to supply the file path to a Dalvik Executable (DEX) file which it will dynamically load within its own process and execute in with its own system privileges. This app cannot be disabled by the user and the attack can be performed by a zero-permission app. Executing commands as the system user can allow a third-party app to video record the user's screen, factory reset the device, obtain the user's notifications, read the logcat logs, inject events in the Graphical User Interface (GUI), and obtains the user's text messages, and more. Executing code as the system user can allow a third-party app to factory reset the device, obtain the user's Wi-Fi passwords, obtain the user's notifications, read the logcat logs, inject events in the GUI, change the default Input Method Editor (IME) (e.g., keyboard) with one contained within the attacking app that contains keylogging functionality, and obtains the user's text messages, and more.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceA pre-installed system app (com.lovelyfont.defcontainer v7.0.11) on Tecno Camon Android devices contains an exported service (FunctionService) that allows any co-located app to supply a DEX file path for dynamic loading and execution with system-level privileges. This zero-permission attack vector cannot be disabled by users and enables arbitrary code execution as the system user.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 8.1.0\/o11019\/f-180828v106\CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Verify device model and variantCheck if the device is Tecno Camon model h612 (tecno Id5a) using 'getprop ro.product.device' or 'getprop ro.product.model'Affected if Device model is h612 or tecno Id5a
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Confirm Android OS versionCheck Android version using Settings > About Phone or 'getprop ro.build.version.release'Affected if Android version is 8.1.0 (build o11019/f-180828v106)
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Identify the vulnerable appList installed packages and check for 'com.lovelyfont.defcontainer' using 'pm list packages' or a package manager appAffected if Package com.lovelyfont.defcontainer is present on the device
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Check app versionQuery the app version using 'dumpsys package com.lovelyfont.defcontainer' or view in device app settingsAffected if Version is 7.0.11
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Verify service export statusUse 'adb shell dumpsys package com.lovelyfont.defcontainer' to inspect the manifest and check if FunctionService has android:exported=trueAffected if FunctionService is exported (android:exported not set to false)
A device is affected if it is a Tecno Camon h612/Id5a running Android 8.1.0 with com.lovelyfont.defcontainer v7.0.11 installed and its FunctionService remains exported.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataThis vulnerability requires a firmware update from Tecno to either remove the vulnerable app/service or implement proper permission checks. Users should monitor for manufacturer security patches.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing8.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2019-15349 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2019-15349 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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