CVE-2019-20032
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedAn attacker with access to an InMail voicemail box equipped with the find me/follow me feature on Aspire-derived NEC PBXes, including all versions of SV8100, SV9100, SL1100 and SL2100 devices, may access the system's administration modem.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceAn attacker with existing access to an InMail voicemail box equipped with the find me/follow me feature on Aspire-derived NEC PBX systems (SV8100, SV9100, SL1100, SL2100) can leverage this feature to access the system's administration modem. This vulnerability requires prior authentication to the voicemail system as the initial attack vector.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the PBX modelDetermine if the system is one of the following NEC models: SV8100, SV9100, SL1100, or SL2100. This can typically be done via system maintenance terminal, web interface, or system hardware labeling.Affected if The system is any of these four models (all firmware versions are affected)
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Verify InMail voicemail is configuredCheck if the NEC InMail voicemail feature is enabled on the PBX system. This is typically accessible through the system programming interface or voicemail administration menu.Affected if InMail voicemail boxes exist on the system, creating the attack surface for this vulnerability
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Confirm find me/follow me feature statusExamine the configuration of individual voicemail boxes to determine if the find me/follow me feature is enabled. This feature allows calls to ring additional destinations and may expose the administration modem interface.Affected if Find me/follow me is enabled on any voicemail box, which is the specific configuration required for exploitation
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Check voicemail box access controlsReview which users or boxes have access to the voicemail system, as the vulnerability requires prior authentication to an InMail voicemail box.Affected if Any voicemail box has valid credentials or access that could be obtained by an attacker
A user is affected if they operate an NEC SV8100, SV9100, SL1100, or SL2100 PBX with InMail voicemail where the find me/follow me feature is enabled on at least one voicemail box.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataRestrict voicemail box access permissions, disable the find me/follow me feature if not required, and ensure the administration modem is network-segmented or isolated from the voicemail system. Contact NEC for available firmware updates addressing this vulnerability.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation6.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2019-20032 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2019-20032 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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