Sv8100 FirmwareOperating system · Nec

CVE-2019-20033

CRITICAL · 9.8 CVSS v3.1 Published 2020-07-29
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
100/100
Remediation priority · Urgent
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
On Aspire-derived NEC PBXes, including all versions of SV8100 devices, a set of documented, static login credentials may be used to access the DIM interface.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

The DIM (Digital Interface Management) interface on Aspire-derived NEC PBXes including SV8100 devices uses documented, static login credentials that are publicly known. An unauthenticated remote attacker with network access to the DIM interface can use these default credentials to gain administrative access to the PBX system.

MitigationImmediately change the default credentials on all affected PBX devices to unique, strong passwords. If the DIM interface is not required for operations, disable it or restrict network access to authorized management networks only.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
Sv8100 FirmwareOperating system
Affected:all versions

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify NEC PBX device model
    Check the system identifier or login banner for 'NEC SV8100' or 'Aspire' PBX system references. Access the system administration interface or check device firmware/version information.
    Affected if The device is an NEC SV8100 or other Aspire-derived PBX system
  2. Determine if DIM interface is enabled
    Access the PBX system configuration and check whether the Digital Interface Management (DIM) interface is turned on. This is typically found in the system networking or remote management settings.
    Affected if DIM interface is enabled and available on the network
  3. Check DIM network exposure
    Verify if the DIM service port (typically port 23/telnet or configured port) is listening and accessible from network segments. Use 'netstat' or port scanning tools to confirm the DIM port is exposed beyond trusted management networks.
    Affected if DIM interface port is accessible from untrusted networks or the internet
  4. Verify default credentials have been changed
    Review the DIM service user accounts configuration. Compare the administrative account passwords against the documented default credentials. Attempt authentication with known default credentials if authorized to confirm they still work.
    Affected if The default administrative credentials for DIM remain unchanged or still function

A system is affected if it is an NEC SV8100 or Aspire-derived PBX with the DIM interface enabled and exposed, and the default DIM credentials have not been changed from their documented default values.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Immediately change the default credentials on all affected PBX devices to unique, strong passwords. If the DIM interface is not required for operations, disable it or restrict network access to authorized management networks only.

Fix this in Sv8100 Firmware Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation4.0 h
  • Implementation8.0 h
  • Testing4.0 h
  • Review / QA2.0 h
18.0 hours of engineering $3,200
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Scan for this in your stack

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dbcve dependency scanner

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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2019-20033 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
  • No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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