CVE-2019-4169
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedIBM Open Power Firmware OP910 and OP920 could allow access to BMC via IPMI using default OpenBMC password even after BMC password was changed away from the default password. IBM X-Force ID: 158702.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceIBM Open Power Firmware OP910 and OP920 contains a hardcoded credential vulnerability where the default OpenBMC password remains functional for IPMI authentication even after an administrator changes the BMC password. This allows remote attackers to gain unauthorized access to the BMC via IPMI using the default credentials.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= op910= op920CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Open Power firmware versionRun 'cat /etc/os-version' or use IPMI command 'ipmi-fru' to read the firmware version. Alternatively, check the BMC web interface or use 'obmcutil --print' to display the OpenBMC version.Affected if The firmware version displays op910 or op920 exactly.
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Confirm IPMI service is accessibleVerify the IPMI over LAN service is enabled by checking the BMC network configuration. Use 'ipmitool -I lanplus -H <BMC_IP> chassis status' or check the BMC web interface under IPMI settings.Affected if IPMI over LAN is enabled and the BMC is network-accessible.
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List IPMI user accountsUse 'ipmitool -I lanplus -H <BMC_IP> -U ADMIN -P <current_pass> user list' to view configured IPMI users. Note the number of enabled accounts.Affected if Multiple IPMI users exist or the default 'admin' account is present with its default password still functional.
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Verify BMC password change effectivenessChange the BMC password via IPMI or web interface, then attempt authentication with both the new password and the default OpenBMC password (typically '0penBMC' or 'ADMIN').Affected if Authentication succeeds with the default password after the administrator has set a new password.
The system is affected if it runs IBM Open Power firmware op910 or op920, has IPMI over LAN enabled, and the default OpenBMC password remains functional for IPMI authentication after an administrator changes the BMC password.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply IBM firmware updates for OP910 and OP920 that address this vulnerability. Until patched, restrict IPMI network access to trusted networks and monitor for unauthorized BMC access.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2019-4169 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2019-4169 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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