CVE-2020-14510
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedGateManager versions prior to 9.2c, The affected product contains a hard-coded credential for telnet, allowing an unprivileged attacker to execute commands as root.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceGateManager versions prior to 9.2c contain a hard-coded credential for the telnet service. This allows any unauthenticated attacker to use this credential to connect via telnet and execute arbitrary commands with root-level privileges.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 9.2cCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Determine the installed GateManager firmware versionAccess the GateManager web interface or check the system information page. Alternatively, run the command 'dmidecode' or check '/proc/version' if you have CLI access to the appliance.Affected if The firmware version is less than 9.2c (for example, 9.2b, 9.1, 9.0, etc.)
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Identify if the telnet service is enabledCheck the GateManager service configuration or running services list. On the appliance CLI, run 'netstat -tulpn' or 'ss -tulpn' to list listening services. Look for port 23 (telnet) in the output.Affected if The telnet service (port 23) is listening and enabled on the system
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Locate the telnet service configurationExamine the telnet daemon configuration files. Common locations include '/etc/xinetd.d/telnet', '/etc/inetd.conf', or check the GateManager's internal service configuration if accessible via the web UI under Services or Network settings.Affected if The telnet configuration file exists and the service is configured to run (especially with 'disable = no' or similar setting)
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Inspect for hard-coded credentials in telnet configurationOpen the telnet service configuration file and search for any username/password pairs stored in plain text. Look for credentials defined within the configuration that are not user-configurable.Affected if A hard-coded username and password pair is found in the telnet configuration that was not set by the administrator
You are affected if your GateManager firmware version is prior to 9.2c AND the telnet service is enabled, as this combination allows unauthenticated root access using the known hard-coded credential.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpgrade GateManager to version 9.2c or later which removes the hard-coded credential. If upgrading is not immediately possible, disable the telnet service and use SSH with proper authentication instead.
9.2c
- 1. Identify the current Gatemanager firmware version by accessing the admin interface or running 'show version' via CLI
- 2. Navigate to the official Allot/Gatemanager support portal and download firmware version 9.2c or later
- 3. Access the Gatemanager administrative web interface (typically https://<device-ip>:8443)
- 4. Go to System > Firmware Upgrade or Administration > Software Update
- 5. Upload the downloaded 9.2c firmware file and initiate the upgrade
- 6. Wait for the upgrade to complete and the device to reboot automatically
- 7. Verify the new firmware version is 9.2c or later after reboot
- 8. Confirm that the hard-coded telnet credential no longer functions
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2020-14510 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2020-14510 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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