SecdoApplication · Paloaltonetworks
CVE-2020-1984
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedSecdo tries to execute a script at a hardcoded path if present, which allows a local authenticated user with 'create folders or append data' access to the root of the OS disk (C:\) to gain system privileges if the path does not already exist or is writable. This issue affects all versions of Secdo for Windows.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceSecdo for Windows attempts to execute a script from a hardcoded filesystem path. A local authenticated user with 'create folders or append data' permissions at the disk root (C:\) can place a malicious script at this path, which will be executed with SYSTEM privileges when the Secdo service runs, resulting in local privilege escalation.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data
SecdoApplication
all versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm Secdo installationCheck for the presence of the Secdo service by running 'Get-Service -Name Secdo' or checking for Secdo-related processes in Task ManagerAffected if Secdo service or process is found running on the system
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Check service privilegesRun 'sc qc secdo' or view service properties in services.msc to verify the service runs under the SYSTEM or another elevated accountAffected if The Secdo service is configured to run with elevated privileges (such as LocalSystem)
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Identify the hardcoded script pathInspect Secdo installation files, configuration, or binaries to locate the hardcoded filesystem path used for script execution (consult vendor documentation for the specific path)Affected if A hardcoded path is found in Secdo components
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Verify script presence at hardcoded pathCheck if a script file exists at the hardcoded path identified in the previous step using File Explorer or 'Get-Item' commandAffected if A script file exists at the hardcoded path used by Secdo
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Assess root disk permissionsReview permissions on C:\ using 'icacls C:\' or the Security tab in Explorer to determine if unprivileged users have 'Create folders' or 'Append data' permissionsAffected if Unprivileged users can create files or folders at the disk root (C:\)
If Secdo is installed and unprivileged users can create files at C:\ where a script gets executed with SYSTEM privileges, the system is vulnerable to local privilege escalation.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataRestrict filesystem permissions on the root of the OS disk to prevent unprivileged users from creating files/folders at C:\, or remove the hardcoded script execution functionality and implement secure, validated script paths.
Fix this in Secdo
Scoped from the published advisory
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $2,800.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2020-1984 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2020-1984 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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