SecdoApplication · Paloaltonetworks
CVE-2020-1985
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedIncorrect Default Permissions on C:\Programdata\Secdo\Logs folder in Secdo allows local authenticated users to overwrite system files and gain escalated privileges. This issue affects all versions Secdo for Windows.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Secdo endpoint detection agent for Windows installs with overly permissive NTFS permissions on its logs directory (C:\Programdata\Secdo\Logs), allowing any authenticated local user to modify or replace files in this directory. This can be exploited for privilege escalation by replacing executable files or DLLs that the Secdo service loads with elevated system privileges.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data
SecdoApplication
all versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Confirm Secdo installation existsVerify the presence of the Secdo installation directory by checking if C:\Programdata\Secdo exists using 'Test-Path C:\Programdata\Secdo' in PowerShell or dir C:\ProgramData\Secdo at command promptAffected if The directory does not exist - Secdo is not installed and this CVE does not apply
-
Verify Logs subdirectory existsConfirm the logs subdirectory exists at C:\Programdata\Secdo\Logs using 'Test-Path C:\Programdata\Secdo\Logs' or by listing directory contentsAffected if The Logs directory does not exist - the vulnerable configuration is not present
-
Check NTFS permissions on Logs directoryRun 'icacls C:\Programdata\Secdo\Logs' or use PowerShell Get-Acl cmdlet to retrieve the access control list. Examine the output for entries granting write, modify, or full control permissions to 'Authenticated Users', 'Users', or specific non-admin user accountsAffected if Authenticated Users, Users group, or standard user accounts are listed with permissions that include WRITE, MODIFY, or FULL CONTROL - the vulnerability is present
-
Identify the Secdo service accountRun 'Get-Service -Name Secdo*' or check services.msc to find the Secdo service, then examine the service account under which it runs using 'wmic service where "name='Secdo'" get StartName'Affected if The Secdo service runs with elevated privileges (SYSTEM, LocalSystem, or a dedicated service account) while standard users have write access to the Logs directory - exploitation is possible
-
Check for replaceable binaries or DLLs in Logs directoryList all files in C:\Programdata\Secdo\Logs using 'dir C:\Programdata\Secdo\Logs /s /b' and examine file extensions for .exe, .dll, or other executable file typesAffected if Executable files or DLLs exist in the Logs directory that could be replaced by a low-privileged user to achieve privilege escalation
A system is affected if Secdo is installed with a Logs directory at C:\Programdata\Secdo\Logs where authenticated users or standard user accounts have write or modify permissions, enabling potential DLL/executable replacement for privilege escalation.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataRestrict NTFS permissions on C:\Programdata\Secdo\Logs to remove write access for standard authenticated users, allowing only administrators and the Secdo service account.
Fix this in Secdo
Scoped from the published advisory
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $1,984.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2020-1985 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2020-1985 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data