GlobalprotectApplication · Paloaltonetworks
CVE-2020-1988
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedAn unquoted search path vulnerability in the Windows release of Global Protect Agent allows an authenticated local user with file creation privileges on the root of the OS disk (C:\) or to Program Files directory to gain system privileges. This issue affects Palo Alto Networks GlobalProtect Agent 5.0 versions before 5.0.5; 4.1 versions before 4.1.13 on Windows;
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceAn unquoted service path vulnerability in Palo Alto Networks GlobalProtect Agent for Windows allows an authenticated local user with file creation privileges on C:\ or Program Files to place a malicious executable in an unquoted path, achieving SYSTEM-level privileges. This is a classic DLL/hijacking vulnerability stemming from the service binary path not being properly quoted.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data
GlobalprotectApplication
>= 4.1.0, < 4.1.13>= 5.0.0, < 5.0.5CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- High
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Check if GlobalProtect Agent is installed and identify its versionOpen Registry Editor and navigate to HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\PaloAltoNetworks\GlobalProtect or query with PowerShell: Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\PaloAltoNetworks\GlobalProtect' | Select-Object versionAffected if Version is between 4.1.0 and 4.1.12 inclusive, or between 5.0.0 and 5.0.4 inclusive (compare against the affected ranges >= 4.1.0, < 4.1.13 and >= 5.0.0, < 5.0.5)
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Find the GlobalProtect service name and query its binary pathRun 'sc queryex type= service state= all' to find the GlobalProtect service, then run 'sc qc <servicename>' to query the configuration; alternatively, use PowerShell: Get-WmiObject win_service -Filter "name LIKE '%GlobalProtect%'" | Select-Object Name, PathNameAffected if The service exists and the PathName (binPath) is present
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Determine if the service binary path is unquotedExamine the PathName from the previous step; check if the path contains spaces and is not enclosed in quotation marks (for example, C:\Program Files\Palo Alto Networks\GlobalProtect\gp.exe vs "C:\Program Files\Palo Alto Networks\GlobalProtect\gp.exe")Affected if The path contains spaces and lacks surrounding quotes - this is the unquoted service path condition
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Check file system permissions on directories in the unquoted pathUse icacls or PowerShell to check write permissions on C:\ and C:\Program Files (for example, run 'icacls C:\' or check the ACL of each directory component in the unquoted path); also identify which users have Create Files privilege in these locationsAffected if Authenticated users or non-admin accounts have file creation/write permissions on C:\ or Program Files directories, enabling placement of a malicious executable in the unquoted path
A user is affected if GlobalProtect Agent version falls within the vulnerable ranges AND the service binary path contains spaces without quotes AND non-admin users have file creation permissions on directories in that unquoted path.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor data4.1.135.0.5
Upgrade GlobalProtect Agent to version 5.0.5 or later (for 5.x) or 4.1.13 or later (for 4.1.x). Restrict file creation permissions on C:\ and Program Files directories to administrative users only as a compensating control.
Fix this in Globalprotect
Scoped from the published advisory
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation3.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $2,272.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2020-1988 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2020-1988 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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