CVE-2020-2004
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedUnder certain circumstances a user's password may be logged in cleartext in the PanGPS.log diagnostic file when logs are collected for troubleshooting on GlobalProtect app (also known as GlobalProtect Agent) for MacOS and Windows. For this issue to occur all of these conditions must be true: (1) 'Save User Credential' option should be set to 'Yes' in the GlobalProtect Portal's Agent configuration, (2) the GlobalProtect user manually selects a gateway, (3) and the logging level is set to 'Dump' while collecting troubleshooting logs. This issue does not affect GlobalProtect app on other platforms (for example iOS/Android/Linux). This issue affects GlobalProtect app 5.0 versions earlier than 5.0.9, GlobalProtect app 5.1 versions earlier than 5.1.2 on Windows or MacOS. Since becoming aware of the issue, Palo Alto Networks has safely deleted all the known GlobalProtectLogs zip files sent by customers with the credentials. We now filter and remove these credentials from all files sent to Customer Support. The GlobalProtectLogs zip files uploaded to Palo Alto Networks systems were only accessible by authorized personnel with valid Palo Alto Networks credentials. We do not have any evidence of malicious access or use of these credentials.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe GlobalProtect app for MacOS and Windows logs user credentials in cleartext to the PanGPS.log diagnostic file under specific conditions: when 'Save User Credential' is enabled, the user manually selects a gateway, and troubleshooting logs are collected with 'Dump' logging level enabled. This exposes passwords in plaintext within log files sent to support.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data>= 5.0.0, < 5.0.9>= 5.1.0, < 5.1.2CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Check installed GlobalProtect versionOn Windows: open Programs and Features, find 'Palo Alto Networks GlobalProtect' and note the version. On MacOS: open Finder, go to Applications, right-click GlobalProtect, select 'Get Info' to view the version.Affected if Version is 5.0.0 through 5.0.8, or 5.1.0 through 5.1.1 (these are the affected ranges)
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Verify if Save User Credential is enabledCheck the GlobalProtect portal or agent configuration. On Windows, the setting is typically found in the registry or via the GlobalProtect interface under portal settings. Look for the 'Save User Credential' or 'Save Password' option.Affected if The 'Save User Credential' setting is enabled in the GlobalProtect configuration
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Inspect PanGPS.log for plaintext credentialsLocate the PanGPS.log diagnostic file. Default paths: Windows - C:\Program Files\Palo Alto Networks\GlobalProtect\PanGPS.log or %LOCALAPPDATA%\Palo Alto Networks\GlobalProtect\Logs\PanGPS.log; MacOS - /Library/Logs/PaloAltoNetworks/GlobalProtect/PanGPS.log. Open the file and search for password strings in plain text.Affected if The log file contains plaintext passwords or user credentials, indicating the condition has been triggered
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Check if Dump logging level is configuredIn the GlobalProtect client settings or troubleshooting options, look for the logging level configuration. 'Dump' logging level is typically set when collecting detailed troubleshooting logs.Affected if The 'Dump' logging level is enabled for troubleshooting log collection
You are affected if GlobalProtect version is 5.0.0-5.0.8 or 5.1.0-5.1.1 AND the 'Save User Credential' setting is enabled AND you have collected troubleshooting logs with 'Dump' level (plaintext credentials may appear in PanGPS.log).
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor data5.0.95.1.2
Upgrade GlobalProtect app to version 5.0.9 or later for 5.0.x, or 5.1.2 or later for 5.1.x on Windows/MacOS. Alternatively, disable 'Save User Credential' in the GlobalProtect Portal agent configuration or avoid using 'Dump' logging level when collecting troubleshooting logs.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2020-2004 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2020-2004 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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