CVE-2020-27256
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedIn SOOIL Developments Co., Ltd Diabecare RS, AnyDana-i and AnyDana-A, a hard-coded physician PIN in the physician menu of the insulin pump allows attackers with physical access to change insulin therapy settings.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe insulin pumps (Diabecare RS, AnyDana-i, AnyDana-A) contain a hard-coded physician PIN that provides bypass of the physician menu authentication. An attacker with physical access to the device can use this PIN to access the physician menu and modify insulin therapy settings, potentially affecting patient safety.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 3.0< 3.0< 3.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Physical
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the insulin pump modelLocate the device label on the insulin pump or access the device's about/settings menu to confirm the model name (Sooil Anydana A, Sooil Anydana I, or Sooil Diabecare Rs)Affected if The model is one of the three affected products listed
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Determine the installed firmware versionAccess the device settings or about menu and locate the firmware version information. This is typically found under Settings > Device Info or a similar menu path on the pumpAffected if The firmware version displayed is below 3.0 (for example, 2.x, 2.9.x, etc.)
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Compare firmware version to affected rangeDocument the exact firmware version number and compare it against the affected range: Anydana A < 3.0, Anydana I < 3.0, or Diabecare Rs < 3.0Affected if The firmware version is less than 3.0 for any of the three affected models
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Verify if PIN has been changed from defaultAttempt to access the physician menu using the default hard-coded PIN (if known) or check with the device operator if the physician PIN has ever been changed from the factory defaultAffected if The device is running a vulnerable firmware version AND the physician PIN remains at the factory default setting
You are affected if you are using a Sooil Anydana A, Anydana I, or Diabecare Rs insulin pump with firmware version below 3.0 that still has the default hard-coded physician PIN.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor data3.0
Replace the hard-coded PIN with a unique, securely generated PIN per device, implement proper authentication mechanisms, and require PIN change on first use. Coordinate with the vendor (SOOIL) for firmware updates that address this vulnerability.
- Consultation8.0 h
- Implementation16.0 h
- Testing12.0 h
- Review / QA8.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $12,352.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2020-27256 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2020-27256 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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