CVE-2020-3143
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA vulnerability in the video endpoint API (xAPI) of Cisco TelePresence Collaboration Endpoint (CE) Software, Cisco TelePresence Codec (TC) Software, and Cisco RoomOS Software could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to conduct directory traversal attacks on an affected device. The vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of user-supplied input to the xAPI of the affected software. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted request to the xAPI. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to read and write arbitrary files in the system. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker would need either an In-Room Control or administrator account.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceA directory traversal vulnerability in the xAPI (extensible API) of Cisco TelePresence video endpoints (CE, TC, and RoomOS software) allows authenticated attackers (with In-Room Control or administrator accounts) to read and write arbitrary files by crafting malicious requests with path traversal sequences (e.g., ../../). The vulnerability stems from insufficient input validation on user-supplied paths in the xAPI endpoint.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- High
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify device model and firmware typeAccess the device web interface or use xCommand SystemUnit to retrieve the product name (e.g., Ex60, Ex90, Sx10, Sx20, Sx80, Codec C40/C60/C90) and firmware type (CE, TC, or RoomOS)Affected if The device is one of the listed models: Cisco Ex60, Ex90, Sx10, Sx20, Sx80, or Codec C40/C60/C90
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Confirm xAPI endpoint is accessibleAttempt to reach the xAPI endpoint via HTTP/HTTPS (typically port 443 or 8080) or use the xAPI command-line interface over SSH to send an HTTP request to the deviceAffected if The xAPI endpoint responds to requests - the vulnerability exists in the xAPI service
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Check for In-Room Control accountsQuery the device user database via xAPI using 'xCommand UserManagement List' or check the local user configuration in the web interface under Users or Security settingsAffected if In-Room Control user accounts are configured on the device
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Verify administrator accounts existQuery the device for administrator accounts using 'xCommand UserManagement List' or check the Administration settings in the web interfaceAffected if Administrator accounts are present on the device (the vulnerability can be exploited by either In-Room Control or admin accounts)
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Assess network exposure of xAPIReview firewall rules, ACLs, or network segmentation to determine if the xAPI port (443, 8080, or SSH) is accessible from untrusted networksAffected if xAPI is accessible from outside the trusted management network
Your environment is affected if you have any of the listed Cisco TelePresence devices (Ex60, Ex90, Sx10, Sx20, Sx80, Codec C40/C60/C90) with xAPI accessible and at least one In-Room Control or administrator account configured.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply vendor-supplied patches/updates from Cisco for affected CE, TC, and RoomOS software versions. If patches are unavailable, restrict network access to xAPI and disable unused In-Room Control accounts.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $2,800.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2020-3143 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2020-3143 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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