Data Center Network ManagerApplication · Cisco
CVE-2020-3380
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA vulnerability in the CLI of Cisco Data Center Network Manager (DCNM) could allow an authenticated, local attacker to elevate privileges to root and execute arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system. The vulnerability is due to insufficient restrictions during the execution of an affected CLI command. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by authenticating as the fmserver user and submitting malicious input to a specific command. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to elevate privileges to root and execute arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceA local privilege escalation vulnerability in Cisco DCNM's CLI allows an attacker authenticated as the fmserver user to execute arbitrary commands with root privileges due to insufficient input validation/restrictions on a specific CLI command.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data
Data Center Network ManagerApplication
< 11.4\(1\)CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Determine installed Cisco DCNM versionLog into the DCNM management interface or run 'dcnm_version' command via CLI, or check the installation directory for version files. On Linux appliances, check /opt/cisco/dcm/fm/version or similar version files in the installation path.Affected if The installed version is earlier than 11.4(1)
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Verify fmserver account existenceCheck if the 'fmserver' system account exists on the DCNM server by examining /etc/passwd (Linux) or the local user database. This account is created during DCNM installation for fabric management services.Affected if The fmserver account exists and is active on the system
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Identify vulnerable CLI command accessExamine which commands the fmserver user can access via the DCNM CLI. The vulnerability exists in a specific DCNM CLI command that allows command injection. Check the sudoers configuration or RBAC settings for fmserver privileges.Affected if The fmserver user has access to the vulnerable CLI command without proper restrictions
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Check command execution restrictionsReview the configuration of the specific DCNM CLI command that the fmserver user can invoke. Look for lack of input validation or unrestricted parameter passing that could allow command injection.Affected if The CLI command accepts user-supplied input without sanitization or restriction, allowing arbitrary command execution as root
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Audit fmserver user privilegesList all sudo permissions or RBAC roles assigned to the fmserver account. Check for any elevated privileges that would permit running commands as root or accessing privileged functions.Affected if The fmserver user has sudo or elevated privileges that permit root-level command execution
You are affected if your Cisco DCNM installation is version earlier than 11.4(1) AND the fmserver account has access to the vulnerable unrestricted CLI command that permits privilege escalation to root.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor data11.4
Apply the vendor-provided security patch for CVE-2020-3380 and ensure the fmserver account follows least-privilege principles with strict access controls.
Fix this in Data Center Network Manager
Scoped from the published advisory
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation6.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $4,304.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2020-3380 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2020-3380 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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