CVE-2020-3386
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA vulnerability in the REST API endpoint of Cisco Data Center Network Manager (DCNM) could allow an authenticated, remote attacker with a low-privileged account to bypass authorization on the API of an affected device. The vulnerability is due to insufficient authorization of certain API functions. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted request to the API using low-privileged credentials. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to perform arbitrary actions through the REST API with administrative privileges.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceThis is an authorization bypass vulnerability in Cisco DCNM's REST API where low-privileged accounts can perform administrative actions due to insufficient authorization checks on certain API functions. Attackers with basic credentials can send crafted requests to execute arbitrary operations with admin-level privileges.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 11.4\(1\)CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify installed Cisco DCNM versionAccess the DCNM web interface, go to Administration > DCNM Server Settings, or run 'show version' via CLI. Alternatively, check the installation directory or RPM package: 'rpm -q dcnm' or look at the installer filename.Affected if The installed version is any release prior to 11.4(1), such as 11.3(x), 11.2(x), or earlier.
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Confirm REST API is enabledCheck DCNM configuration for REST API service status. Typically found in DCNM's Administration > REST API settings, or by reviewing the dcnm-server.properties or similar configuration files in the installation directory.Affected if The REST API service is enabled and accessible on the network.
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Audit existing DCNM user accountsLog into DCNM as administrator and navigate to Administration > User Management or AAA configuration. Review the list of local and external users, noting their assigned roles and privilege levels.Affected if There are any non-administrative or basic-privilege accounts configured in DCNM.
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Review API access logs for privilege escalation attemptsExamine DCNM audit logs, typically stored in /usr/local/cisco/dcm/fms-audit/ or accessible via the web interface under Monitoring > Logs. Search for API calls from standard users performing administrative operations.Affected if Audit logs show API requests from low-privilege users that invoked administrative API endpoints.
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Check for unauthorized admin role assignmentsReview user account role assignments in Administration > User Management. Look for users with 'Super Admin', 'Network Admin', or equivalent elevated roles who should not have such access.Affected if Any standard or basic-privilege user account has been assigned administrator-level roles.
A user is affected if their DCNM installation is version 11.3(x) or earlier with the REST API enabled and there are user accounts present, particularly if low-privilege accounts exist or show signs of elevated access in logs.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor data11.4
Apply the vendor patch or upgrade to a fixed Cisco DCNM version. If immediate patching is not possible, restrict API access through network segmentation and monitor for unauthorized administrative API activity.
- Consultation6.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing12.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2020-3386 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2020-3386 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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