CVE-2020-36167
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedAn issue was discovered in the server in Veritas Backup Exec through 16.2, 20.6 before hotfix 298543, and 21.1 before hotfix 657517. On start-up, it loads the OpenSSL library from the Installation folder. This library in turn attempts to load the /usr/local/ssl/openssl.cnf configuration file, which may not exist. On Windows systems, this path could translate to <drive>:\usr\local\ssl\openssl.cnf. A low privileged user can create a :\usr\local\ssl\openssl.cnf configuration file to load a malicious OpenSSL engine, resulting in arbitrary code execution as SYSTEM when the service starts. This gives the attacker administrator access on the system, allowing the attacker (by default) to access all data, access all installed applications, etc. If the system is also an Active Directory domain controller, then this can affect the entire domain.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceVeritas Backup Exec loads an OpenSSL library on startup which attempts to load a configuration file from /usr/local/ssl/openssl.cnf. On Windows systems, this translates to C:\usr\local\ssl\openssl.cnf. A low-privileged attacker can create this path and inject a malicious OpenSSL engine configuration, achieving arbitrary code execution as SYSTEM.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data>= 20.0, < 20.0.1188.2734>= 21.0, < 21.0.1200.1217CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm Backup Exec installation and versionCheck the installed version of Veritas Backup Exec using Windows Registry (HKLM\SOFTWARE\Veritas\Backup Exec\Install\Version) or check the executable version at typical installation paths like C:\Program Files\Veritas\Backup Exec\BEREMOTE.exeAffected if Version is >= 20.0 and < 20.0.1188.2734, or >= 21.0 and < 21.0.1200.1217
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Check for vulnerable config file pathVerify if the path C:\usr\local\ssl\openssl.cnf exists on the systemAffected if The file C:\usr\local\ssl\openssl.cnf exists and contains or can be modified to contain a malicious OpenSSL engine configuration
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Check parent directory permissionsCheck if low-privileged users can create the directory structure C:\usr\local\ssl\ by examining write permissions on C:\usr\ and C:\usr\local\Affected if Non-privileged users have write access to create C:\usr\local\ssl\ and place a malicious openssl.cnf file there
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Verify OpenSSL engine loading behaviorMonitor or inspect Backup Exec process startup to confirm it loads an OpenSSL library that attempts to read from the hardcoded path C:\usr\local\ssl\openssl.cnfAffected if The Backup Exec service loads OpenSSL and the config path C:\usr\local\ssl\openssl.cnf is reachable and writable by the attacker
Your environment is affected if Backup Exec version falls within the vulnerable ranges AND the path C:\usr\local\ssl\ can be created or written to by a low-privileged attacker, allowing injection of a malicious OpenSSL engine configuration.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor data20.0.1188.273421.0.1200.1217
Apply the vendor hotfixes (298543 for version 20.6, 657517 for version 21.2) or upgrade to a patched version. Alternatively, ensure the vulnerable configuration file path does not exist and cannot be created by non-privileged users.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2020-36167 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2020-36167 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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