CVE-2020-5656
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedImproper access control vulnerability in TCP/IP function included in the firmware of MELSEC iQ-R series (RJ71EIP91 EtherNet/IP Network Interface Module First 2 digits of serial number are '02' or before, RJ71PN92 PROFINET IO Controller Module First 2 digits of serial number are '01' or before, RD81DL96 High Speed Data Logger Module First 2 digits of serial number are '08' or before, RD81MES96N MES Interface Module First 2 digits of serial number are '04' or before, and RD81OPC96 OPC UA Server Module First 2 digits of serial number are '04' or before) allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to stop the network functions of the products or execute a malicious program via a specially crafted packet.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceImproper access control in the TCP/IP function of MELSEC iQ-R series firmware allows remote unauthenticated attackers to send specially crafted packets that can either stop network functions (DoS) or execute malicious code (RCE). The vulnerability affects multiple network interface modules including EtherNet/IP, PROFINET IO, and OPC UA servers, identified by serial number prefixes.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify installed MELSEC iQ-R network modulesCheck the system hardware configuration or PLC project settings for presence of RJ71EIP91, RJ71PN92, RD81DL96, RD81MES96N, or RD81OPC96 modulesAffected if Any of these five module model numbers are present in the system configuration
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Verify network protocol configurationAccess the module configuration via GX Works3 or the module's web interface and check if EtherNet/IP, PROFINET IO, or OPC UA server features are enabledAffected if Any of these network interface features are configured and active on the affected module
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Check module firmware versionConnect to the module via GX Works3 or web browser and retrieve the firmware version from the module information screenAffected if The module firmware version is any version (all versions of these modules are affected)
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Assess network exposureReview network firewall rules and segmentation to determine if the affected module's network interface is accessible from untrusted networksAffected if The module's TCP/IP network interface is reachable from networks outside the trusted control system network
The environment is affected if any of the five vulnerable module models (RJ71EIP91, RJ71PN92, RD81DL96, RD81MES96N, RD81OPC96) are installed with network functions enabled and accessible from the network.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpdate firmware to versions that address the serial number threshold requirements. Until patches are applied, restrict network access to affected modules using firewalls or network segmentation to limit exposure to untrusted networks.
Contact vendor for latest firmware version
- Contact Mitsubishi Electric technical support to obtain the latest firmware version for your specific module
- Verify the serial number of your affected module to determine if it falls within the affected range (RJ71EIP91: serial prefix '02' or before, RJ71PN92: '01' or before, RD81DL96: '08' or before, RD81MES96N: '04' or before, RD81OPC96: '04' or before)
- Request and apply the firmware update from Mitsubishi Electric that addresses the improper access control vulnerability
- After updating, verify that network functions operate normally
- Implement network segmentation and firewall rules to limit exposure of the affected modules to untrusted networks as an additional protective measure
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA3.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2020-5656 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2020-5656 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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