Bigfix MobileApplication · Hcltech

CVE-2021-27783

MEDIUM · 6.5 CVSS v3.1 Published 2022-05-25
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
71/100
Remediation priority · Elevated
Remotely reachable Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
User generated PPKG file for Bulk Enroll may have unencrypted sensitive information exposed.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · moderate confidence

User-generated provisioning package (PPKG) files used for bulk device enrollment in an enterprise mobility management system contain sensitive information (likely credentials or configuration data) that is stored without encryption, allowing unauthorized access to that sensitive data.

MitigationEncrypt PPKG files at rest and in transit, implement secure storage mechanisms with proper access controls, and rotate any exposed credentials immediately.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
Bigfix MobileApplication
Affected:= 2.0= 2.1
Bigfix Modern Client ManagementApplication
Affected:= 2.0= 2.1

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
None
Availability
None

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify installed product and version
    Check the installed version of Hcltech Bigfix Mobile or Hcltech Bigfix Modern Client Management. Look in the application program files directory, check the software inventory, or run the product's version query command.
    Affected if The installed version is exactly 2.0 or 2.1 of either product.
  2. Locate provisioning package (PPKG) files
    Search the filesystem for .ppkg files. Common locations include the product's configuration directory, enrollment data folder, or any designated provisioning package storage location.
    Affected if PPKG files exist on the system.
  3. Inspect PPKG file contents
    Open or extract the PPKG files and examine their contents. Look for any plaintext sensitive data such as passwords, tokens, API keys, or unencrypted configuration settings.
    Affected if The PPKG files contain readable sensitive information in plaintext (not encrypted).
  4. Check file permissions on PPKG files
    Review the access control list (ACL) on the PPKG files to determine which users or groups can read them. On Windows, use icacls or file properties security tab.
    Affected if Users other than authorized administrators can read the PPKG files.
  5. Verify encryption status of PPKG storage
    Examine how PPKG files are stored. Check if the storage location uses encryption at rest (such as BitLocker, EFS, or encrypted filesystem) or if the files themselves are encrypted with a proper encryption mechanism.
    Affected if PPKG files are stored without encryption at rest and are accessible to unauthorized users.

A user is affected if they have Hcltech Bigfix Mobile or Modern Client Management version 2.0 or 2.1 installed with existing PPKG files that contain unencrypted sensitive data.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Encrypt PPKG files at rest and in transit, implement secure storage mechanisms with proper access controls, and rotate any exposed credentials immediately.

Fix this in Bigfix Mobile Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation4.0 h
  • Implementation8.0 h
  • Testing6.0 h
  • Review / QA4.0 h
22.0 hours of engineering $3,860
Get help mitigating

An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $6,176.

Scan for this in your stack

Free · runs locally
dbcve dependency scanner

Check whether your project pulls in CVE-2021-27783 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.

References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2021-27783 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.

What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
  • No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
  • No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data