CVE-2021-43767
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedOdyssey passes to client unencrypted bytes from man-in-the-middle When Odyssey storage is configured to use the PostgreSQL server using 'trust' authentication with a 'clientcert' requirement or to use 'cert' authentication, a man-in-the-middle attacker can inject false responses to the client's first few queries. Despite the use of SSL certificate verification and encryption, Odyssey will pass these results to client as if they originated from valid server. This is similar to CVE-2021-23222 for PostgreSQL.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceOdyssey passes unencrypted bytes from MITM attackers to clients when configured to use PostgreSQL with 'trust' authentication plus 'clientcert' requirement or 'cert' authentication. An attacker can inject false responses to the client's first queries before SSL certificate verification completes, and Odyssey forwards these results to the client as if legitimate.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data>= 9.6.0, < 9.6.24>= 10.0, < 10.19>= 11.0, < 11.14>= 12.0, < 12.9>= 13.0, < 13.5= 14.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- High
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Odyssey installationLocate the Odyssey configuration file (typically at /etc/odyssey/odyssey.conf or /usr/local/etc/odyssey.conf) or check running processes for odyssey binaryAffected if Odyssey is installed and configured to pool PostgreSQL connections
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Check PostgreSQL authentication method configurationIn Odyssey config, locate the 'auth' or 'authentication' directive for backend PostgreSQL connections. Also check pg_hba.conf on the PostgreSQL server for the 'trust' or 'cert' authentication methodsAffected if Backend authentication is set to 'trust' with 'clientcert' requirement, or uses 'cert' authentication
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Verify SSL/TLS verification settingsIn Odyssey configuration, check if 'ssl' is enabled and what verification mode is set (verify-ca, verify-full, or no verification) for backend connectionsAffected if SSL verification is disabled or set to a mode that allows connection before certificate validation completes
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Confirm client-facing SSL configurationExamine Odyssey's client-side SSL settings in config - check if 'ssl' is enabled on listener and what mode (verify-ca, verify-full) is used for incoming client connectionsAffected if Clients connect without full SSL certificate verification (verify-full)
A user is affected if Odyssey is configured to use 'trust' or 'cert' authentication toward PostgreSQL backends while SSL verification can be bypassed or occurs after initial data forwarding
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped9.6.2410.1911.14
Review and harden PostgreSQL authentication configurations - avoid 'trust' authentication with 'clientcert' requirement; ensure Odyssey properly validates SSL/TLS before passing any data to clients; consider using 'verify-full' SSL mode.
PostgreSQL 9.6.24, 10.19, 11.14, or 12.9 (depending on your current major version)
- Identify the currently running PostgreSQL version using: SELECT version();
- Determine the appropriate upgrade path based on your current major version (9.6.x -> 9.6.24, 10.x -> 10.19, 11.x -> 11.14, 12.x -> 12.9)
- Back up all databases and configuration files before upgrading
- For production environments, test the upgrade in a staging environment first
- Stop the PostgreSQL service before performing the upgrade
- Upgrade PostgreSQL to the appropriate fixed version for your major release line
- After upgrade, verify the server starts successfully and connections work properly
- Run pg_dumpall on the old cluster and pg_restore if doing a major version upgrade to ensure data integrity
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation6.0 h
- Implementation20.0 h
- Testing12.0 h
- Review / QA8.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2021-43767 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2021-43767 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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