CVE-2022-31734
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedCisco Catalyst 2940 Series Switches provided by Cisco Systems, Inc. contain a reflected cross-site scripting vulnerability regarding error page generation. An arbitrary script may be executed on the web browser of the user who is using the product. The affected firmware is prior to 12.2(50)SY released in 2011, and Cisco Catalyst 2940 Series Switches have been retired since January 2015
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceA reflected cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in the web interface error page generation of Cisco Catalyst 2940 Series Switches. An attacker can inject arbitrary JavaScript through malicious input in error page parameters, which executes in the context of the victim's browser when they interact with the crafted URL.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 12.2\(50\)sy< 12.2\(50\)syCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Confirm device modelIdentify the exact Cisco Catalyst 2940 model by checking the device label or using the 'show version' command via console or telnet/SSH. Only WS-C2940-8TF-S and WS-C2940-8TT-S are affected by this CVE.Affected if Device model is WS-C2940-8TF-S or WS-C2940-8TT-S
-
Check firmware versionUse the 'show version' command to display the running firmware version. Compare the displayed version against 12.2(50)SY - versions below this threshold are affected.Affected if Firmware version is below 12.2(50)SY
-
Verify web interface is enabledCheck if the HTTP or HTTPS web interface is active by reviewing the device configuration. Use 'show running-config | include http' or check the ip http server / ip https server status.Affected if HTTP or HTTPS server is enabled on the device
-
Assess network accessibilityDetermine if the device web interface is reachable from untrusted networks by reviewing ACLs and network exposure. The XSS requires a victim to access a crafted URL.Affected if Web interface is accessible from networks where potential victims could be directed to malicious links
Device is affected only if it is a WS-C2940-8TF-S or WS-C2940-8TT-S running firmware below 12.2(50)SY with the web interface enabled and accessible to potential victims.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped12.2
Upgrade affected devices to firmware version 12.2(50)SY or later. Since the product was retired in January 2015 and no longer receives security updates, consider replacing end-of-life devices with currently supported hardware.
12.2(50)SY or later
- 1. Verify current firmware version by accessing the switch management interface or using 'show version' command
- 2. Download firmware version 12.2(50)SY or later from Cisco's official firmware repository
- 3. Review Cisco Catalyst 2940 upgrade documentation and release notes for compatibility requirements
- 4. Back up current switch configuration using 'copy running-config tftp' or similar method
- 5. Upload the new firmware to the switch's flash memory
- 6. Set the new firmware as the boot image using 'boot system' command
- 7. Reload the switch to apply the new firmware
- 8. Verify the upgrade was successful and confirm the new version using 'show version'
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $5,120.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2022-31734 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2022-31734 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data