CVE-2022-3927
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe affected products store both public and private key that are used to sign and protect Custom Parameter Set (CPS) file from modification. An attacker that manages to exploit this vulnerability will be able to change the CPS file, sign it so that it is trusted as the legitimate CPS file. This issue affects * FOXMAN-UN product: FOXMAN-UN R15B, FOXMAN-UN R15A, FOXMAN-UN R14B, FOXMAN-UN R14A, FOXMAN-UN R11B, FOXMAN-UN R11A, FOXMAN-UN R10C, FOXMAN-UN R9C; * UNEM product: UNEM R15B, UNEM R15A, UNEM R14B, UNEM R14A, UNEM R11B, UNEM R11A, UNEM R10C, UNEM R9C. List of CPEs: * cpe:2.3:a:hitachienergy:foxman-un:R15B:*:*:*:*:*:*:* * cpe:2.3:a:hitachienergy:foxman-un:R15A:*:*:*:*:*:*:* * cpe:2.3:a:hitachienergy:foxman-un:R14B:*:*:*:*:*:*:* * cpe:2.3:a:hitachienergy:foxman-un:R14A:*:*:*:*:*:*:* * cpe:2.3:a:hitachienergy:foxman-un:R11B:*:*:*:*:*:*:* * cpe:2.3:a:hitachienergy:foxman-un:R11A:*:*:*:*:*:*:* * cpe:2.3:a:hitachienergy:foxman-un:R10C:*:*:*:*:*:*:* * cpe:2.3:a:hitachienergy:foxman-un:R9C:*:*:*:*:*:*:* * cpe:2.3:a:hitachienergy:unem:R15B:*:*:*:*:*:*:* * cpe:2.3:a:hitachienergy:unem:R15A:*:*:*:*:*:*:* * cpe:2.3:a:hitachienergy:unem:R14B:*:*:*:*:*:*:* * cpe:2.3:a:hitachienergy:unem:R14A:*:*:*:*:*:*:* * cpe:2.3:a:hitachienergy:unem:R11B:*:*:*:*:*:*:* * cpe:2.3:a:hitachienergy:unem:R11A:*:*:*:*:*:*:* * cpe:2.3:a:hitachienergy:unem:R10C:*:*:*:*:*:*:* * cpe:2.3:a:hitachienergy:unem:R9C:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceHitachi Energy FOXMAN-UN and UNEM products store both public and private cryptographic keys used to sign Custom Parameter Set (CPS) files. The private key is insecurely stored, allowing an attacker who obtains it to modify CPS files and re-sign them to appear as legitimate, trusted files. This is a critical key management and integrity bypass vulnerability.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< r16a< r16aCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify installed product versionLocate the version information for FOXMAN-UN or UNEM in the product interface, about section, or system information files. Common locations include the administration console, version log files, or the installed packages directory.Affected if The installed version is earlier than r16a (e.g., r15, r14, or earlier)
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Confirm CPS file signing is in useCheck if the system is configured to use Custom Parameter Set (CPS) files. Look for CPS file locations in the product configuration, typically in data directories, parameter folders, or custom configuration areas where CPS files are stored or processed.Affected if CPS files are created, imported, or processed in the environment
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Locate CPS signing keysSearch the product installation directory and configuration folders for cryptographic key files associated with CPS signing. Look for private key files (commonly .key, .pem, .p12, or custom extensions) in config, data, or keys directories.Affected if Private key files exist in insecure locations such as application directories, config folders, or locations with weak access controls
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Verify key file permissionsExamine file system permissions on any discovered CPS signing private key files. Check if the private key file is readable by non-admin users, stored without encryption, or located in a world-readable directory.Affected if Private keys have weak file permissions (world-readable, group-readable without proper group membership, or stored unencrypted)
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Check for default or embedded keysReview product documentation or configuration to determine if the CPS signing key is a default embedded key shipped with the product rather than a customer-generated unique key.Affected if The same private key is used across multiple installations or was shipped pre-configured with the product
You are affected if your installed FOXMAN-UN or UNEM version is earlier than r16a AND the system uses CPS file signing with privately stored signing keys.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedReplace the embedded private key with a properly secured key managed through a hardware security module (HSM) or secure key management system, implement key rotation, and update the CPS file validation to detect tampered files.
FOXMAN-UN r16a or later; UNEM r16a or later
- Upgrade FOXMAN-UN to version r16a or later
- Upgrade UNEM to version r16a or later
- After upgrade, verify that the new hardcoded keys have been replaced with properly managed credentials
- Confirm that CPS file signing/validation functions correctly with the updated key management
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation16.0 h
- Implementation40.0 h
- Testing24.0 h
- Review / QA12.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $25,856.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2022-3927 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2022-3927 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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