CVE-2022-45190
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedAn issue was discovered on Microchip RN4870 1.43 devices. An attacker within BLE radio range can bypass passkey entry in the legacy pairing of the device.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceThe Microchip RN4870 BLE module version 1.43 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in its legacy BLE pairing mechanism. An attacker within BLE radio range can bypass the passkey entry requirement during legacy pairing, allowing unauthorized BLE connections to the device without knowing the correct passkey.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 1.43CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Adjacent
- Complexity
- High
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify RN4870 firmware versionSend the AT command 'AT+VERR?' or 'ATI' to the RN4870 module over UART/SPI and capture the response to determine the installed firmware version.Affected if The firmware version reported is exactly 1.43
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Verify legacy BLE pairing configurationSend the AT command 'AT+AUTH?' to query the current authentication/pairing settings on the RN4870 module.Affected if The response shows legacy BLE pairing (AUTH=0 or AUTH=1) is enabled rather than LE Secure Connections only
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Confirm BLE service is advertisingUse a BLE scanner or sniffer to observe if the RN4870 device is actively advertising and accepting incoming BLE connections.Affected if The device is discoverable and accepting connections with legacy pairing enabled
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Test passkey bypass capabilityAttempt to connect to the RN4870 using a BLE tool (such as hcitool, gatttool, or a mobile BLE app) and observe if legacy pairing can be completed without proper passkey entry.Affected if Legacy pairing completes without requiring the correct passkey or with an incorrect passkey
A user is affected if the RN4870 firmware is version 1.43 AND legacy BLE pairing is enabled, allowing unauthorized BLE connections without proper passkey authentication.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpdate the RN4870 firmware to a patched version if available, and if possible, disable legacy BLE pairing by enforcing Secure Connections (LE Secure Connections) pairing mode to prevent this bypass.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $6,176.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2022-45190 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2022-45190 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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