CVE-2022-50214
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: coresight: Clear the connection field properly coresight devices track their connections (output connections) and hold a reference to the fwnode. When a device goes away, we walk through the devices on the coresight bus and make sure that the references are dropped. This happens both ways: a) For all output connections from the device, drop the reference to the target device via coresight_release_platform_data() b) Iterate over all the devices on the coresight bus and drop the reference to fwnode if *this* device is the target of the output connection, via coresight_remove_conns()->coresight_remove_match(). However, the coresight_remove_match() doesn't clear the fwnode field, after dropping the reference, this causes use-after-free and additional refcount drops on the fwnode. e.g., if we have two devices, A and B, with a connection, A -> B. If we remove B first, B would clear the reference on B, from A via coresight_remove_match(). But when A is removed, it still has a connection with fwnode still pointing to B. Thus it tries to drops the reference in coresight_release_platform_data(), raising the bells like : [ 91.990153] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 91.990163] refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. [ 91.990212] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 461 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xa0/0x144 [ 91.990260] Modules linked in: coresight_funnel coresight_replicator coresight_etm4x(-) crct10dif_ce coresight ip_tables x_tables ipv6 [last unloaded: coresight_cpu_debug] [ 91.990398] CPU: 0 PID: 461 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G W T 5.19.0-rc2+ #53 [ 91.990418] Hardware name: ARM LTD ARM Juno Development Platform/ARM Juno Development Platform, BIOS EDK II Feb 1 2019 [ 91.990434] pstate: 600000c5 (nZCv daIF -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 91.990454] pc : refcount_warn_saturate+0xa0/0x144 [ 91.990476] lr : refcount_warn_saturate+0xa0/0x144 [ 91.990496] sp : ffff80000c843640 [ 91.990509] x29: ffff80000c843640 x28: ffff800009957c28 x27: ffff80000c8439a8 [ 91.990560] x26: ffff00097eff1990 x25: ffff8000092b6ad8 x24: ffff00097eff19a8 [ 91.990610] x23: ffff80000c8439a8 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffff80000c8439c2 [ 91.990659] x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffff00097eff1a10 x18: ffff80000ab99c40 [ 91.990708] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: ffff80000abf6fa0 [ 91.990756] x14: 000000000000001d x13: 0a2e656572662d72 x12: 657466612d657375 [ 91.990805] x11: 203b30206e6f206e x10: 6f69746964646120 x9 : ffff8000081aba28 [ 91.990854] x8 : 206e6f206e6f6974 x7 : 69646461203a745f x6 : 746e756f63666572 [ 91.990903] x5 : ffff00097648ec58 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000027 [ 91.990952] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff00080260ba00 [ 91.991000] Call trace: [ 91.991012] refcount_warn_saturate+0xa0/0x144 [ 91.991034] kobject_get+0xac/0xb0 [ 91.991055] of_node_get+0x2c/0x40 [ 91.991076] of_fwnode_get+0x40/0x60 [ 91.991094] fwnode_handle_get+0x3c/0x60 [ 91.991116] fwnode_get_nth_parent+0xf4/0x110 [ 91.991137] fwnode_full_name_string+0x48/0xc0 [ 91.991158] device_node_string+0x41c/0x530 [ 91.991178] pointer+0x320/0x3ec [ 91.991198] vsnprintf+0x23c/0x750 [ 91.991217] vprintk_store+0x104/0x4b0 [ 91.991238] vprintk_emit+0x8c/0x360 [ 91.991257] vprintk_default+0x44/0x50 [ 91.991276] vprintk+0xcc/0xf0 [ 91.991295] _printk+0x68/0x90 [ 91.991315] of_node_release+0x13c/0x14c [ 91.991334] kobject_put+0x98/0x114 [ 91.991354] of_node_put+0x24/0x34 [ 91.991372] of_fwnode_put+0x40/0x5c [ 91.991390] fwnode_handle_put+0x38/0x50 [ 91.991411] coresight_release_platform_data+0x74/0xb0 [coresight] [ 91.991472] coresight_unregister+0x64/0xcc [coresight] [ 91.991525] etm4_remove_dev+0x64/0x78 [coresight_etm4x] [ 91.991563] etm4_remove_amba+0x1c/0x2c [coresight_etm4x] [ 91.991598] amba_remove+0x3c/0x19c ---truncated---
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysisMemory is used after it has been freed, so its contents — now potentially attacker-controlled — drive the program's behaviour. With careful heap grooming this becomes code execution. The fix requires disciplined ownership of memory and often a targeted rework of the object lifecycle.
General guidance for the use after free class — the official description and references above are authoritative for this specific CVE. Want a bespoke review and a reviewed fix? Ask our team →
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data>= 5.3, < 5.4.211>= 5.5, < 5.10.137>= 5.11, < 5.15.61>= 5.16, < 5.18.18>= 5.19, < 5.19.2CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped5.4.2115.10.1375.15.61
Upgrade to kernel version 5.4.211 or later (for 5.3-5.4.x branch), 5.10.137 or later (for 5.5-5.10.x branch), 5.15.61 or later (for 5.11-5.15.x branch), or 5.18.18 or later (for 5.16-5.18.x branch) - or migrate to the latest stable kernel release available
- 1. Identify the current kernel version using `uname -r` or `cat /proc/version`
- 2. Determine which branch of the affected versions your current kernel falls into (5.3-5.4.x, 5.5-5.10.x, 5.11-5.15.x, or 5.16-5.18.x)
- 3. Plan kernel upgrade to the appropriate fixed version: for 5.3-5.4.x branch upgrade to 5.4.211 or later; for 5.5-5.10.x branch upgrade to 5.10.137 or later; for 5.11-5.15.x branch upgrade to 5.15.61 or later; for 5.16-5.18.x branch upgrade to 5.18.18 or later
- 4. Before upgrading, ensure all critical data is backed up
- 5. Obtain the patched kernel from your Linux distribution's official repositories or kernel.org (https://kernel.org)
- 6. Install the new kernel package using your distribution's package manager (e.g., `apt-get install linux-image-<version>`, `yum install kernel-<version>`, or `dnf install kernel-<version>`)
- 7. Update bootloader configuration if necessary (e.g., update-grub or equivalent for your system)
- 8. Reboot the system into the new kernel
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2022-50214 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2022-50214 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
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