CVE-2023-37543
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedCacti before 1.2.6 allows IDOR (Insecure Direct Object Reference) for accessing any graph via a modified local_graph_id parameter to graph_xport.php. This is a different vulnerability than CVE-2019-16723.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceCacti before 1.2.6 contains an IDOR vulnerability in graph_xport.php where the local_graph_id parameter is not properly validated against the current user's permissions. An authenticated attacker can manipulate this parameter to access any graph in the system, including those they are not authorized to view.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 1.2.6CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Locate Cacti installation directorySearch for Cacti web files such as index.php, include/global.php, or the lib/ directory within your web server document root (commonly /var/www/html/cacti, /usr/share/cacti, or C:\inetpub\wwwroot\cacti on Windows).Affected if Cacti is installed on this system
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Determine Cacti versionOpen the file include/global.php in the Cacti directory and locate the variable $config['cacti_version'] to read the version number, or log into the Cacti web interface and navigate to Help > About.Affected if The installed version is any version prior to 1.2.6 (for example, 1.2.5, 1.2.4, 1.1.x, etc.)
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Verify graph_xport.php existsCheck for the file graph_xport.php in the root Cacti directory. This file handles graph export functionality and contains the vulnerable code.Affected if The file graph_xport.php exists in the Cacti installation
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Confirm user authentication is enabledVerify that Cacti user authentication is configured and functional by checking the Settings > Authentication page in the Cacti admin console, or by confirming that login is required to access the graph export features.Affected if User authentication is enabled and users can log in to Cacti (the IDOR requires an authenticated session to exploit)
A system is affected by this CVE when running any Cacti version prior to 1.2.6 with graph_xport.php accessible to authenticated users.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped1.2.6
Upgrade Cacti to version 1.2.6 or later which includes proper authorization validation for the local_graph_id parameter in graph_xport.php.
Cacti 1.2.6 or later
- 1. Backup the current Cacti database using: mysqldump -u <username> -p <cacti_database> > cacti_backup.sql
- 2. Backup the Cacti installation directory (typically /var/www/html/cacti or /usr/share/cacti)
- 3. Download Cacti version 1.2.6 or later from the official Cacti website (https://www.cacti.net/downloads/)
- 4. Extract the new Cacti archive and replace the existing installation files
- 5. Update the Cacti configuration file (include/config.php) with database credentials if needed
- 6. Run the Cacti upgrade script via browser by accessing the Cacti URL, or manually run: php cli/upgrade.php
- 7. Verify the upgrade was successful by logging into Cacti and checking the version under Configuration > Settings > General
- 8. Test that graph access controls are properly enforced by verifying users can only access graphs they are explicitly permitted to view
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $3,088.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2023-37543 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2023-37543 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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