CVE-2023-45220
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Android Client application, when enrolled with the define method 1(the user manually inserts the server ip address), use HTTP protocol to retrieve sensitive information (ip address and credentials to connect to a remote MQTT broker entity) instead of HTTPS and this feature is not configurable by the user.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Android Client application uses unencrypted HTTP instead of HTTPS when retrieving sensitive MQTT broker configuration (IP address and credentials) during enrollment via manual server IP entry. This transmits authentication credentials and infrastructure details in cleartext, allowing interception via network sniffing or man-in-the-middle attacks.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsall versionsall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Adjacent
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm device modelCheck the device model number in the system information or settings menu of the Ctrlx HMI Web Panel. Look for WR2107, WR2110, or WR2115.Affected if The device is a Boschrexroth Ctrlx HMI Web Panel WR2107, WR2110, or WR2115.
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Observe enrollment network trafficDuring the manual server IP entry enrollment process, use a network sniffer or proxy on the network segment to capture traffic between the Android Client and the configuration server. Look for HTTP (port 80) connections rather than HTTPS (port 443).Affected if The enrollment process sends MQTT broker configuration or credentials over unencrypted HTTP.
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Check server URL protocolDuring manual server IP entry in the enrollment workflow, observe what protocol is specified or auto-configured in the server URL field. Check if the URL begins with http:// rather than https://.Affected if The enrollment uses an http:// URL for the configuration server.
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Verify credential transmission methodIf you have access to view the network configuration or enrollment logs, check whether the MQTT broker credentials are transmitted in cleartext or within an encrypted TLS tunnel.Affected if Credentials are transmitted without TLS encryption.
A user is affected if they are using a WR2107, WR2110, or WR2115 Ctrlx HMI Web Panel and perform enrollment via manual server IP entry, which transmits MQTT broker credentials over unencrypted HTTP.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImplement HTTPS for all enrollment and configuration retrieval operations, ensuring TLS encryption protects credentials in transit. Make HTTPS usage configurable or enforce it by default.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $5,120.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2023-45220 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2023-45220 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data